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Extremism in the Electoral Arena: Challenging the 
Myth of American Exceptionalism 
Gur Bligh 
Abstract: This Article explores the limitations that the American 
electoral system imposes upon extremist parties and candidates. Its thesis 
is that extremists, and particularly anti-liberal extremists, are excluded 
from the American electoral arena through a combination of direct 
and indirect mechanisms. This claim challenges the crucial premise of 
American constitutional theory that the free speech doctrine is a distinct 
area of “American exceptionalism.” That theory posits that the 
American strict adherence to viewpoint neutrality, the strong emphasis 
upon the “dissenter,” and the freedom granted to extremist speakers is 
exceptional among liberal democracies. The Article argues that once we 
focus upon the electoral arena as a distinct arena, we discover that in 
this domain of core political expression, dissenting extremists are 
marginalized and blocked and their viewpoints are not represented. 
The Article demonstrates how various structural elements which 
characterize the American electoral system create an insurmountable 
barrier for extremist parties and drive them out of the electoral system. 
Some of these elements have been created intentionally to impede 
extremist political parties. In addition, the Article analyzes several 
federal court decisions that appear to play a crucial role in sealing the 
fate of these extremists by endorsing the right of the major parties to 
exclude extremists from the parties in the name of preserving the party’s 
“right to define itself.” The Article concludes with an examination of 
the various implications of this analysis. It compares the American 
approach to extremism in the electoral arena with the approach adopted 
in other democracies, and then the Article reflects upon the lessons that 
can be drawn for relevant issues in American electoral law.  
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[T]he constitutional guarantee [of the First Amendment] has its 
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American constitutional theory regards free speech doctrine as a 
distinct area of “American exceptionalism.”2 Indeed, the American 
strict adherence to viewpoint neutrality,3 the strong emphasis upon 
the “dissenter”—the lone critic, the non-conformist4—and the total 
rejection of any limitations upon extremist speakers, except in very 
 
 1. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). 
 2. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 32–42 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (“Although 
hate speech and defamation provide the most vivid and well-discussed examples, American 
exceptionalism in fact exists throughout the domain of freedom of expression. . . . Where in 
the rest of the world freedom of expression appears to be understood as an important value to 
be considered along with other important values . . . in the United States the freedom of 
expression occupies pride of place, prevailing with remarkable consistency in its conflicts with 
even the most profound of other values and the most important of other interests.”); Gregory 
H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 (1995) (“The 
United States, with little tradition of a fascist or monarchical right or a truly revolutionary left, 
generally adheres to a procedural tolerance confident in its ability to diffuse extremist threats 
through open debate.”). 
 3. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”); see 
also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents . . . apply the 
most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential 
burdens upon speech because of its content.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) 
(“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive 
or disagreeable.”); Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 
684, 688 (1959) (stating that banning film because it advocates an unconventional idea 
“str[ikes] at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty”); Yates v. United States, 354 
U.S. 298, 344 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The First 
Amendment . . . leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite 
causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of 
us.”). 
 4. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 133 (1986) (“[E]xtremes are not to be understood as the 
peripheral cost of an inevitably imperfect world, in which no one can be trusted to draw the 
proper lines properly, but rather as integral to the central functions of the principle of free 
speech.”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 10 
(1999) (“If we must have a ‘central meaning’ of the First Amendment, we should recognize 
that the dissenters—those who attack existing customs, habits, traditions, and authorities—
stand at the center of the First Amendment and not at its periphery.”). 
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rare circumstances, is exceptional among liberal democracies. While 
other liberal democracies severely limit antidemocratic speech, hate 
speech, and racism,5 the First Amendment protects the right of Neo-
Nazis to march in Jewish neighborhoods,6 the Ku Klux Klan to freely 
call for hostile acts against African Americans and Jews,7 and hate 
groups to distribute their messages on the Internet.8 Moreover, 
American exceptionalism holds that this libertarian approach has 
particular significance in the context of political speech, especially 
within electoral campaigns.9 Thus, although various liberal 
democracies, mostly in Europe, impose explicit limitations on 
extremist political parties, the American exceptionalist conventional 
wisdom has been that the question of limitations upon political 
parties is a largely “un-American” issue, relevant only in countries in 
which the libertarian tradition of free speech is not so central to the 
constitutional framework.10 
This Article challenges the validity of this exceptionalist paradigm 
as applied to extremist parties and candidates in the American 
 
 5. See, e.g., John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 
539 (2006); Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of 
Regulations in the United States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253 (2003). 
 6. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978) (examining the Skokie 
Affair). 
 7. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
 8. See Knechtle, supra note 5, at 540 (“While the United States is becoming a hub for 
Internet hate speech, other countries are prohibiting hateful content distributed on the 
Internet in their countries.”); see also Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 
7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2002). 
 9. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantee [of the First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the 
conduct of campaigns for political office.”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) 
(characterizing “political expression” as standing “‘at the core of our electoral process and of 
the First Amendment freedoms’” (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))). 
 10. The limitations which were imposed in the past, specifically upon Socialist speakers 
and the CPUSA—the American Communist Party—are considered part of the “Red Scares” of 
the 1920s and of the 1940s and are looked upon with shame and indignation. See, e.g., DAVID 
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 215 (1994) (“We 
like to think we are more tolerant in this country. . . . But the fact is that in periods of real or 
imagined danger we have tended to adopt measures strikingly similar in effect to those 
expressly countenanced by the [German] Basic Law . . . .”); Martin H. Redish, Unlawful 
Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 9, 93 (2004) (“The constitutional concern should be for how our government behaved 
and for the ominous messages that governmental behavior sent to the populace. Nothing in 
the revelations of the Venona or Comintern documents in any way alters the fundamental 
inconsistency between governmental action during the McCarthy era and the values of a free 
society.”). 
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electoral arena. The Article argues that once we change our point of 
reference and focus upon the electoral arena as a distinct arena,11 we 
discover that in this domain of core political expression, dissenting 
extremists are marginalized and blocked, their viewpoints are not 
represented, and the ideological landscape is centralized and limited. 
The exclusion of extremists, and particularly anti-liberal extremists, 
from the electoral arena is conducted through a combination of 
direct and indirect mechanisms. Thus, various structural—seemingly 
“neutral”—elements which characterize the American electoral 
system create an insurmountable barrier for extremist parties and 
candidates and drive them out of the electoral system. Some of these 
elements have been created intentionally to impede extremist 
political parties. In addition, the major parties have chosen to 
exclude extremists who attempted to participate in major parties’ 
nomination processes. These exclusion decisions have been upheld 
by federal courts, closing the major avenue of participation for these 
extremists.12 Thus, the American electoral system imposes an implicit 
banning regime which blocks extremist representation and leaves 
extremists outside of the major decision-making bodies of the 
nation. 
This Article introduces in Part II the party banning phenomenon 
and its international manifestations. In Part III, it discusses the 
limitations imposed in the United States on extremist speech outside 
the electoral arena. Part IV discusses the structural characteristics of 
the American electoral system and the extent to which they limit the 
participation of extremist parties. Part V explains to what extent 
these structural barriers were adopted intentionally to curb 
extremism. Part VI discusses how major parties exclude extremists 
seeking to operate within their ranks and to what extent courts 
protect these exclusion decisions. Finally, Part VII concludes with a 
discussion of the various implications of this de facto exclusion of 
extremists from the American electoral system. It compares the 
American approach to extremism in the electoral arena with the 
 
 11. In this respect, my argument makes use of recent scholarship which argues that the 
electoral arena is distinct from the general free speech world. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, 
Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 25–33 (1998); 
Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 
1763–66 (1999); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the 
First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1899–22 (1999). 
 12. See infra Part VI.B. 
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approach adopted in other democracies, and then reflects upon the 
lessons that can be drawn from this account for relevant issues in 
American electoral law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Historically, the question of extremist participation in the 
electoral arena received significant worldwide attention in the 1940s 
and 1950s in the context of the post-war fear of the return of 
Fascism and Nazism and the growing fear of Communism. 
However, lately, the party-banning instrument has received renewed 
attention. This is largely due to the resurgence of radical right 
movements in Western Europe, the emergence of ethnic and 
religious fundamentalist political parties in the Middle East and 
Europe and the worldwide “War Against Terror.”13 In recent years, 
racist and xenophobic parties in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Israel were the focus of restrictive proceedings. In 2003, the 
Spanish Supreme Court banned the Batasuna party, claimed to be 
the political wing of the E.T.A.—the Basque separatist terrorist 
organization.14 In the same year, the European Court of Human 
Rights upheld the Turkish ban of the Islamic Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi), holding that its Islamic agenda goes against fundamental 
democratic principles.15 Moreover, the new democratization process 
in the Middle East has forced some of the countries in that region to 
deal with strong Islamic fundamentalist parties that combine 
electoral participation with a radical Islamic agenda and frequent use 
of violence. Notable examples can be found in Gaza (Hamas), 
Lebanon (Hezbollah), and Iraq (some of the Shiite parties, like 
Moktada al-Sadr’s movement).16 These developments in Europe and 
 
 13. See Patrick Macklem, Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-
Determination, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 488, 491 (2006) (“Despite its historical pedigree, 
questions relating to the nature and scope of militant democracy have acquired greater political 
and legal salience in recent years. No doubt, the rejuvenation of militant democracy is partly a 
response to the profoundly destabilizing potential of new forms of terrorism and religious 
fundamentalism.”). 
 14. See Víctor Ferreres Comella, The New Regulation of Political Parties in Spain, and 
the Decision to Outlaw Batasuna, in MILITANT DEMOCRACY 133, 133–36 (András Sajó ed., 
Eleven Int’l Publ’g 2004). 
 15. Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267. 
 16. See Noah Feldman, Ballots and Bullets, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 9. 
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the Middle East have led to renewed academic interest in the 
possibility of restricting extremist political parties.17 
Traditionally, the discussion of restrictions on political parties 
tended to highlight the libertarian ethos of the American free speech 
jurisprudence, and to stress the American rejection of any limitations 
upon radical speakers. A significant example is Fox and Nolte’s 
seminal article which discusses the banning of political parties in a 
comparative perspective. Fox and Nolte characterize the United 
States as a procedural democracy—which effectively does not limit 
extremism in the electoral arena. They regard countries like 
Germany, however, as a substantive democracy because Germany 
limits extremist parties in the electoral system.18 
It appears that this approach has been affected by the 
understandable, but misguided, tendency to lump together 
restrictions upon extremist political speech and restrictions upon 
extremist electoral participation.19 Initially, this tendency seems 
reasonable given the natural connection between freedom of speech 
in the political arena at-large and the right to electoral 
participation.20 However, despite this obvious connection between 
 
 17. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (2007); 
Nancy L. Rosenblum, Banning Parties: Religious and Ethnic Partisanship in Multicultural 
Democracies, 1 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 17 (2007). 
 18. See Fox & Nolte, supra note 2, at 37. It should be noted that Fox and Nolte label 
the United States as a “militant procedural democracy” because of the limitations imposed on 
the Communists during the 1950s, but it is clear from their description that today it would be 
considered a “tolerant procedural democracy.” As they explain, “[t]he United States, with little 
tradition of a fascist or monarchical right or a truly revolutionary left, generally adheres to a 
procedural tolerance confident in its ability to diffuse extremist threats through open debate.” 
Id. 
 19. Id. at 26; see also Stephen G. Breyer, Symposium on Terrorism, Globalization and the 
Rule of Law: An Introduction, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1981, 1985 (2006) (“The experience of 
totalitarianism, however, has made certain societies more risk averse. One consequence of this 
phenomenon is the constitutionalizing of ‘militant democracy’ in countries such as Germany. 
Unlike the United States, where almost all political speech receives strong constitutional 
protection, the German Basic Law allows the banning of political parties that advocate 
totalitarianism or racial hatred.”). For further discussion, see Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 
1418 (“A great deal of the doctrinal work under the First Amendment’s treatment of political 
speech stems from the specific question that is typically presented in American courts: whether 
the speech in question is sufficiently inciteful of criminal conduct to sustain a criminal 
prosecution.”). 
 20. On the most basic level, it is reasonable to assume that one of the main aims of 
political speech is to convince people to support a certain idea and as a result to advance this 
idea through the political process. Similarly, it seems futile to allow a political party to compete 
in an election if it has no access to the marketplace of ideas. Meaningful electoral participation 
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extremist speech in the “marketplace of ideas” and extremist 
participation in the electoral arena, the United States, like other 
countries, does in fact treat the general free speech domain 
differently than the electoral domain. This different treatment 
manifests itself prominently in the context of the present 
discussion—limitations upon extremist political parties. If we 
examine the electoral system as a distinct domain, we will reach a 
surprising conclusion, namely, that the American electoral system is 
in certain respects even more restrictive towards extremists than 
other liberal democracies.21 While the description of this restrictive 
regime will be the focus of this paper, the Article will briefly describe 
the truly libertarian approach controlling extremist speech outside of 
the electoral arena. This account will serve to highlight the dramatic 
differences between these two domains. 
III. EXTREMIST SPEECH OUTSIDE OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
The controlling principle guiding the limitation of extremist 
political speech in the United States evolved from the original “clear 
and present danger” test introduced initially by Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis in the early decades of the twentieth century.22 This test was 
adopted in its present form in 1969,23 and today it is considered the 
accepted framework for evaluating restrictions upon free speech. Yet, 
it was only gradually accepted by the Supreme Court and the legal 
community.24 
During the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of the heightened 
tensions of the Cold War, Congress adopted several legislative acts 
that considerably limited extremist free speech. The most significant 
was the Smith Act of 1940 which prohibited the knowing, or willful 
 
is impossible if the candidate cannot present its agenda to the public in media appearances, 
speeches, newspaper articles, or other modes of expression. 
 21. For a similar argument concerning the structural response to extremist parties in the 
American electoral arena, see Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 1418–20. 
 22. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case 
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create 
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.” (emphasis added)); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 23. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 24. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
AMERICA 119–236 (1988). 
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advocacy or teaching, of the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety 
of overthrowing the United States Government by force or 
violence.25 Despite the restrictive nature of this statute, in Dennis v. 
United States26 the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s constitutionality 
and sustained the conviction of the leaders of the Communist Party 
of America for violations of the Smith Act. In its decision, the Court 
applied a considerably weakened version of the “clear and present 
danger” test. Indeed, the Court adopted the Second Circuit’s 
formula which allowed a conviction even if the danger is not 
imminent when “‘the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to 
avoid the danger.’”27 
Despite this initial rejection of the Holmes-Brandies formula, the 
libertarian version of the “clear and present danger” test gradually 
won the day as the “Red Scare” waned. In Yates v. United States28 
the Court held that a speaker cannot be convicted for his speech if it 
consists of mere “advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow [of 
the government] as an abstract principle,” even if the intent of a 
speaker was to promote violence.29 Then in Brandenburg v. Ohio,30 a 
case involving the conviction of a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group in 
Ohio, the Court held that a state may only prohibit advocacy of 
unlawful conduct if the advocacy “is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”31 This formulation of the test requires proof of both 
the subjective intention of the speaker to produce imminent lawless 
action and an objective likelihood that this action is indeed 
imminent. Later decisions further narrowed the definition of the 
“imminence” requirement.32 
 
 25. Formally called the Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000)). See KALVEN, supra note 24, at 191. 
 26. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 27. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
 28. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
 29. Id. at 318–19. 
 30. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 31. Id. at 447. 
 32. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (holding 
that advocacy of violence “weeks or months” down the road did not satisfy the Brandenburg 
exception); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (“[A]dvocacy of illegal action at some 
indefinite future time” is not considered “imminent.”). 
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This very libertarian formula was often trumpeted as a reflection 
of the American “exceptionalist approach” to political speech. It is 
indeed very protective of extremist speech and differs considerably 
from the approach adopted by other liberal democracies, such as 
Germany or Canada, especially when it comes to extremist racist and 
hate speech.33 As this Article will demonstrate, however, the 
tendency to focus exclusively on the Brandenburg test is misleading 
and partial. To gain true insight about the barriers facing extremists 
in the American electoral arena, we must proceed to examine it as a 
distinct domain. 
IV. EXTREMISM IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA 
A. The Electoral System 
The first major barrier facing extremists in the American electoral 
arena is the electoral system itself. The American electoral system on 
the federal and state levels has been mainly characterized by single-
member districts and a plurality or first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
electoral system.34 In an FPTP system, the candidate who receives 
the most votes in the voting district is considered the winner and 
becomes the district’s representative. The other “losing” candidates 
are not entitled to any representation, and the votes the losing 
candidates receive are in effect “wasted.” An FPTP system is 
generally used for elections in the United Kingdom, Canada, India 
(for the lower house), and other Commonwealth countries.35 It 
seems to be losing some of its appeal in recent years as new 
democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and other parts of 
 
 33. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1542–44, 
1548–54 (2003); Schauer, supra note 2, at 36–38. 
 34. On the state and local level other electoral systems are also employed. For example, 
several states use either multimember districts or a mixture of single-member and 
multimember districts for State House elections (e.g. Arizona, Maryland, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia). See David Lublin & Michael P. 
McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of Redistricting on Competition in State 
House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144, 148 (2006). Some municipalities use an at-large voting 
system in which the entire town or city is considered one district and all the candidates run 
against each other. See DOUGLAS J. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT BOX: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
VOTING SYSTEMS 56 (Prager Pub. 2000). In the past, several cities have also experimented 
with proportional representation. See infra Part V.B. 
 35. See Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed 
Systems, 18 INT’L. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 299–301 (1997). 
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the world tend to adopt “proportional representation” (PR) systems 
or “mixed” electoral systems which combine elements from plurality 
systems with elements from proportional systems.36 
The nature of the electoral system has an enormous effect upon 
the political landscape, especially upon the number of political parties 
and their characteristics. The first significant effect of an FPTP 
system is its tendency to favor a two-party electoral system.37 This 
tendency is widely considered a “sociological law” which has been 
referred to as “Duverger’s Law.”38 In addition, where a two-party 
system prevails, it typically leads to a centralized ideological 
spectrum, which is oriented toward the median voter.39 Since each of 
 
 36. Id. at 298. 
 37. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY 
IN THE MODERN STATE 217 (Malcolm Anderson trans., 1954); see also Howard A. Scarrow, 
Duverger’s Law, Fusion, and the Decline of American “Third” Parties, 39 POL. RES. Q. 634, 
642 (1986). 
 38. Duverger’s Law is explained by a combination of mechanical and psychological 
factors. The mechanical factor is the actual “‘under-representation’ of the third, i.e. the 
weakest party, its percentage of seats being inferior to its percentage of the poll.” DUVERGER, 
supra note 37, at 224. For instance, a minor party which consistently receives 15% of the vote 
in the various electoral districts, would typically receive 15% of the seats in a PR system, but it 
would achieve no representation in the single-member FPTP system because it would never be 
the “winner” in the district. According to Duverger’s law, this mechanical component is 
further reinforced by a psychological factor which is based on the expected tendency of a 
rational voter to vote for one of two alternatives that have a real chance of winning the single 
seat representing the particular district. See id. at 224–26. Others have added a further, elite-
based explanation, for the perpetuation of the two major parties, arguing that a rational 
politician will seek to enter a party in which he has long-term career prospects and only the 
major parties offer that advantage. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND 
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 57 (1995). William Riker suggested 
two exceptions to “Duverger’s Law” which include countries in which “(1) third parties 
nationally are continually one of two parties locally, and (2) one party among several is almost 
always the Condorcet winner in elections.” See William Riker, The Two-Party System and 
Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 753, 761 
(1982). The first exception refers to cases in which the support of the emerging third party is 
concentrated in a specific region of the country, sufficiently so, that it can emerge as the 
winner in certain electoral districts in that particular region. A typical example of this 
phenomenon can be found in Canada. Id. at 301. The second exception was originally focused 
on India, in which one party—the Congress—remained in power for a long period of time. Id. 
at 760–61. 
 39. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114–25 
(1957); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 85 (1942) (“The second effect of the 
two-party system is the fact that it produces moderate parties.”); Richard L. Hasen, 
Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the 
Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 348; Gregory 
P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First Amendment, 44 WM. 
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the two major parties knows that it increases its chances of winning 
by appealing to the other major party’s voters, both major parties 
tend to present a centrist agenda that is acceptable to the moderates 
of the competing party and independents. Thus, instead of 
emphasizing the differences between the two parties, there is a 
natural incentive for both parties to blur their differences and present 
agendas that are not far from the centrist views of the median 
voter.40 This gravitation toward the center is somewhat moderated 
by the need of the major party candidates to appeal to the party 
activists who typically do not hold “median” positions. These 
activists exert considerable influence in the party’s nomination 
process. In addition, they may choose to abandon the party in the 
general election if it completely loses its identity and moves too 
much to the center.41 Yet, despite the influence of party activists, 
most political scientists still hold the view that the effect of party 
activists remains limited and that the structural constraints of the 
two-party system will still severely penalize a party that strays too 
much from the center in a general election.42 
 
& MARY L. REV. 1939, 1997 (2003); Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Extremism” and Anti-Extremism 
in American Party Politics, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 843, 860 (2002). 
 40. For a detailed explanation of this tendency, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. 
Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 
674–75 (1998). 
 41. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 72 (1970) (“[I]n a two-party system a party will not 
necessarily behave as the Hotelling-Downs vote-maximizer because those ‘who have nowhere 
else to go’ are not powerless but influential. . . . The mobilization of the indifferent voters and 
the winning over of the undecided ones was seen to depend to a considerable extent on the 
enthusiasm which each of the parties can inspire among activist party workers and volunteers. 
Since the activists are far from being middle-of-the-roaders, their enthusiasm can be dampened 
by a party’s moving to an excessively middle-of-the-road position.”); Samuel Issacharoff, 
Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan 
Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 306–07 (2001) (“To focus exclusively on the contest 
for the median voter therefore misses much of the critical competitive dynamic of American 
politics. First, to run for office a candidate must prevail in the party nominating process, where 
the power of the activist wing is intensified. But even after nomination, an exclusive focus on 
appealing to the median voter also misses the dramatic effects that a mobilized activist base can 
have in expanding the pool of potential voters for a party’s candidate. With voter turnout 
hovering around the fifty percent mark, activist-fueled get-out-the-vote drives may prove as 
effective in pulling out a close election as concerted appeals to the center.”). 
 42. Rosenblum, supra note 39, at 869 (“Summarizing the four theses explored in this 
section: The forces for party convergence at the center are strong. The forces for polarization 
and targeting are contingent; that is, they are strategic and variable rather than enduring 
structural elements of party identity.”); see also id. at 864 (“As a rule, political scientists accept 
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Furthermore, because only broad-based parties have a real 
chance of winning elections, the FPTP system also dictates the 
evolution of the major parties into broad-based coalitions of interests 
and political forces.43 A single-issue party or a party representing a 
specific sector of the electorate will usually not attract enough voters 
to win. The theory behind this approach is sometimes called the “big 
tent” approach of the major parties. Under the “big tent” approach, 
electoral parties cannot wait to form coalitions until after the 
elections. Instead, these coalitions tend to form before the elections 
when various interest groups and social forces battle for influence 
within the major parties.44 This structure serves as an additional force 
pushing the electoral system toward moderation because the various 
factions coalescing to form a major party have to accommodate each 
other to cooperate within one major party.45 This contributes to the 
development of major parties into open and opportunistic parties, 
which are ideologically diffuse.46 
As a result of the tendency of the major parties to occupy the 
center of the political arena, extremist voters who do not feel 
represented in the major parties are typically forced to form a 
minor/third party.47 While the center is the battleground between 
 
the persistent and stable institutional and attitudinal forces for convergence and centrism in the 
American party system.”). 
 43. See ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT 
AND CONSENT 455 (1967) (“To win national elections, even to win influence over national 
policies, every group must participate somehow in the politics of coalition building.”); JOHN F. 
BIBBY & L. SANDY MAISEL, TWO PARTIES—OR MORE? THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 61 (2d 
ed. 2003) (“[T]he single-member system brings with it incentives toward the creation of two 
broadly based parties that are capable of winning district-level pluralities and majorities in the 
legislative chamber.”). 
 44. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN’T HAPPEN HERE: WHY 
SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 108–09 (2004). 
 45. LARRY J. SABATO, THE PARTY’S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR 
AMERICA’S FUTURE 12 (1988) (“The party tames its own extreme elements by pulling them 
toward an ideological center in order to attract a majority of votes on election day.”). 
 46. LIPSET & MARKS, supra note 44, at 65. 
 47. See Rosenblum, supra note 39, at 851. Indeed, as various political scientists have 
noted, American third parties almost never campaign from the center. See ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND 
THE PARTY SYSTEM 79–80 (1971), quoted in Anderson v. Celebreezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 
n.17 (1983) (“Again and again, minor parties have led from a flank, while the major parties 
still followed opinion down the middle. In time, the middle has moved, and one of the major 
parties or both occupy the ground reconnoitered by the minor party . . . .”); Seymour Martin 
Lipset, What Are Parties For?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 169, 174 (1996).  
BLIGH.FIN 11/24/2008 5:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1380 
the two major parties, the minor parties typically campaign “from the 
flank,” trying to draw support from the more committed and 
extremist voters within each of the two major parties.48 Although it is 
impossible to claim that all minor parties are relatively extreme,49 it 
seems fair to say that the reverse is true, namely, that all extremist 
parties will begin their life as minor parties.50 Yet, even if these minor 
parties succeed in attracting the extremist voters who are unsatisfied 
with the major parties, their chances of success in gaining 
representation are very slim due to the FPTP system. Indeed, the 
FPTP system creates an effective lockup preventing extremist 
representation in the elected organs of government. On the one 
hand, the system tends to create a two-party system that gravitates 
toward the center, while at the same time, it practically blocks 
challenges from minor parties who represent extremist voters who 
feel discontent with the centrist views of the major parties.51 
To summarize, two major conclusions can be drawn from the 
analysis of the American electoral system. First, the FPTP system 
tends to under-represent and effectively block representation of 
segments of the electorate which are not comfortable with the 
centrist agenda of the two major parties.52 Second, the electoral 
landscape created by the FPTP system results in a close association 
between minor parties and extremist parties. That is, typically, a 
 
 48. In fact, as Pippa Norris has recently argued, even third-party candidates that appear 
to be centrists like Ross Perot are no exception to this general rule. See PIPPA NORRIS, 
RADICAL RIGHT: VOTERS AND PARTIES IN THE ELECTORAL MARKET 239 (2005). Norris 
argued that Perot tended to emphasize populist, antiestablishment themes that were similar 
(although obviously not identical) to those traditionally advanced by European radical right 
parties, especially his anti-NAFTA focus, which “tapped into fears of ‘foreigners’ stripping away 
American jobs” and his anti-government themes. Id. 
 49. For example, the Libertarian Party cannot be considered an extremist party. 
Similarly, John Anderson, the independent presidential candidate in the 1980 elections, was 
considered a centrist. 
 50. Theoretically, the extremists could be a silent majority not adequately represented or 
acknowledged in the existing political arena, but this appears to be a rare and unusual 
occurrence. However, in certain cases even if the extremists are in fact a minority, they may 
choose to present themselves as a hidden majority that is not adequately mobilized. See 
Rosenblum, supra note 39, at 852 (“[N]on-centrist groups have been known to claim to 
represent a hidden or silent or moral majority, waiting to be mobilized. Consider this 
manifesto by a leader of the American Militia Organization: ‘Have you noticed that people like 
us are no longer the fanatics; the extremists? Men listen now when we speak. All but fools 
know we’re in a desperate crises [sic] and they’re listening for solutions.’”). 
 51. See Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 1419. 
 52. Norris, supra note 35, at 305. 
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minor party will hold views that are more extreme than the views of 
the two major parties. 
Of course, the single-member-district FPTP system is far from 
being the only possible electoral system. In fact, it is not even a 
constitutional requirement.53 In essence, it reflects a conscious 
institutional decision to prefer certain democratic values and reject 
others. As Justice Breyer explained in Vieth v. Jubelirer, “single-
member-district systems and more-directly-representational systems 
reflect different conclusions about the proper balance of different 
elements of a workable democratic government.”54 For example, 
where states have chosen to employ multi-member electoral districts 
(which by their nature are more representational) the political 
landscape has changed considerably. Indeed, recent research 
comparing the multi-member electoral districts of the Arizona 
House of Representatives with the single-member districts of the 
Arizona Senate, showed substantial differences both in the 
extremism of the elected officials and in their actual legislative 
patterns.55 Unsurprisingly, the multiple-member district 
representatives were more extreme in their views and more 
ideological in their voting patterns compared to state senators 
elected from the same districts but in a single-member system.56 
Even more substantial are the differences between an FPTP 
system and its major rival—the system of proportional representation 
(PR), which is especially widespread among democracies in Europe. 
In a PR system, representation of the entire electorate or of a certain 
constituency is divided among the parties in proportion to the 
number of votes cast for party lists.57 As a result, even a minor party 
that does not stand a chance of gaining a majority will still be 
represented in the legislature according to its comparative power 
within the electorate. Accordingly, a PR system offers a much more 
realistic chance for extremist parties to gain representation in 
 
 53. See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2000) (requiring that members of Congress be elected from 
single-member districts). 
 54. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 358 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 55. Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., Brian E. Russell & Christopher A. Cooper, Legislative 
Representation in a Single-Member Versus Multiple-Member District System: The Arizona State 
Legislature, 57 POL. RES. Q. 337, 343 (June 2004). 
 56. Id. at 338–40. According to the research, this difference was evident despite the fact 
that both senators and representatives represent the exact same geographical districts, have the 
same age limits, residency requirements, and length of terms. 
 57. See Norris, supra note 35, at 303. 
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parliament. Unlike the FPTP system, in a PR system an extremist 
party does not need to emerge as a winner in a certain district in 
order to gain representation. Instead, it is enough that the extremist 
party gathers a proportion of the electorate that is equal to the 
proportional power of one parliament member.58 Moreover, because 
minor party members in a PR system do not need to confront or 
accommodate others with divergent views within the party, there is a 
good chance that their positions will further tilt towards the 
extremes.59 
Indeed, extreme parties have proven to have greater 
representation in PR systems than in FPTP systems. A comparative 
study that examined the success of radical right parties in thirty-nine 
countries found that while radical right parties did not receive a 
smaller share of the popular vote in majoritarian systems in 
comparison to PR systems,60 “radical right parties were more than 
twice as successful in gaining seats in parliament under a PR system 
as under majoritarian systems.”61 “Before-and-after” studies, 
comparing the results of extremist parties before and after a change 
to a PR system, yielded the same result.62 Extremist parties that had 
practically no representation in parliament under an FPTP system 
gained significant representation when the system moved to PR.63 A 
 
 58. Many countries that adopt a proportional representation electoral system also 
require a minimum threshold of votes as a condition for representation in parliament. For 
instance, in Germany a party that receives less than five percent of the vote is not entitled to 
any seats in parliament. See AREND LIJPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A 
STUDY OF TWENTY-SEVEN DEMOCRACIES, 1945–1990, at 11–12, 22 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1994) (explaining the nature of such thresholds and listing the thresholds for different 
countries). 
 59. See John F. Bibby, In Defense of the Two-Party System, in MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN 
AMERICA: PROSPECTS AND PERFORMANCE 45, 49–50 (Paul S. Herrnson & John C. Green ed., 
2d ed. 2002); Pildes, supra note 44, at 110 (explaining that the minor party members “might 
miss out on the dampening effect of heterogeneous debate, leading to the confirmation and 
exacerbation of extreme views”). 
 60. See NORRIS, supra note 48, at 109–14. This finding defied expectations of strategic 
voting and the “wasted vote” assumption. Norris provided two possible explanations: first, it is 
possible that due to the significant ideological distance between the views of radical right 
voters and the positions adopted by the major parties, neither of the parties is considered 
worthy to “earn” their vote. Second, this may be a result of the fact that voters for radical right 
parties vote as an “expressive” or “symbolic” act and therefore are less concerned about the 
practical implications of this vote. 
 61. See NORRIS, supra note 48, at 114. 
 62. Id. at 107. 
 63. Id. In France, for example, the extreme right party Front National failed to win any 
seats in the 1981 parliamentary elections held under a second-ballot majoritarian system, yet 
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party’s share of seats is obviously important because it determines the 
power, legitimacy, status, and resources that flow from elected 
office.64  
Yet, despite the significant difficulty the FPTP system poses for 
minor (and extremist) parties, such parties were considered serious 
contenders in the political arena throughout most of the nineteenth 
century.65 While two major parties dominated the electoral arena, 
minor parties were considered serious contenders in the political 
arena. In certain cases, they succeeded in electing their own 
candidates to public offices, and in other cases, they agreed to 
support a major party’s candidate in return for various concessions, a 
practice that is known as “fusion.” Naturally, these parties presented 
ideological diversity beyond the two major parties.66 
B. State Electoral Laws 
The introduction of state ballot access laws further curtailed the 
limited representation granted to minor and extremist parties in the 
American electoral system. These laws were the product of extensive 
reforms centered on the adoption of the Australian government-
printed ballot.67 This change opened the door for imposing 
additional limitations upon minor parties in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 
The power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” is granted to the 
 
suddenly gained thirty-five seats under the PR system in 1986 only to plummet to one seat in 
1988 after PR was repealed. 
 64. Id. at 108. 
 65. Following the 1896 elections, minor parties held twelve seats in the Senate (out of 
ninety) and twenty-seven seats in the U.S. House of Representatives (out of 357). See U.S. 
Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/ 
history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm; Office of the Clerk: U.S. House of 
Representatives, Party Divisions of the House of Representative (1789 to Present), 
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html.  
 66. See, e.g., STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA: CITIZEN 
RESPONSE TO MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 78–80 (1984) (explaining that minor parties of that 
period resembled major parties: they ran candidates for various offices, held conventions, and 
took stands on a wide range of issues. In addition, they managed to survive beyond one 
electoral cycle); Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifusion 
Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 288–89 (1980) (explaining that fusion “helped maintain a 
significant third party tradition by guaranteeing that dissenters’ votes could be more than 
symbolic protest, that their leaders could gain office, and that their demands might be heard”). 
 67. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 19–20. 
BLIGH.FIN 11/24/2008 5:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1384 
states in the Constitution.68 The states also have complete control 
over the election process for state offices.69 Although this power is 
subject to congressional oversight and other constitutional 
limitations, most significantly the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause, the states still enjoy wide latitude in regulating 
various aspects of state electoral campaigns.70 And indeed, with the 
introduction of state-printed ballots, the states made full use of their 
authority to erect an extensive regulatory framework that effectively 
wiped out minor and extremist parties from the American electoral 
scene. 
1. Ballot access laws 
Typically, a state’s ballot access statute specifies that parties that 
receive a certain number of votes, or a certain percentage in previous 
elections, will be automatically placed on the ballot. However, most 
independent candidates and minor parties do not obtain the required 
percentage of votes necessary to be listed on the ballot. Therefore, to 
be listed on the ballot, these independent and minor party candidates 
are required to file a ballot access petition, which contains a requisite 
number of signatures of registered voters in the state.71 The number 
of signatures needed varies from state to state and from position to 
position and is usually a percentage of the total number of votes cast 
in the last general election or a percentage of the registered voters in 
the state.72 In total, to place an independent presidential candidate 
on the ballot in all fifty states requires more than 800,000 signatures. 
 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 
208, 217 (1989). 
 69. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217. 
 70. See Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the Supreme Court’s 
Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1282 (2005). 
 71. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 19–25; Bradley A. Smith, Judicial 
Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 167, 174–
77 (1991). 
 72. For example, to get a presidential candidate on the 2004 ballot required 153,035 
signatures in California (1% of the registered voters), 58,842 signatures in North Carolina (2% 
of the total votes in the last gubernatorial elections), twenty-five in Tennessee, and no 
signatures at all in states such as Colorado and Louisiana (only a $500 fee). See Richard 
Winger, How Many Parties Ought to Be on the Ballot?: An Analysis of Nader v. Keith, 5 
ELECTION L.J. 170, 196 (2006) (providing a chart with historical details regarding the ballot 
access requirements in the fifty states). In each case Winger lists the minimal ballot access 
requirement. In some states, the easiest route is appearing as an independent candidate while in 
others as a party candidate. 
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To place a party’s presidential candidate on the ballot in all fifty 
states requires even more signatures and requires registration of tens 
of thousands of voters as party members.73 
In addition to substantive signature requirements, many states 
add additional procedural hurdles, such as relatively brief time 
periods for gathering the signatures74 and early deadlines for 
completing the signature petition.75 Furthermore, each state has a 
different set of procedural requirements concerning the eligible 
signatories, the personal details each signatory has to provide, the 
identity of the petition circulators, and various other technical 
matters.76 Finally, as recently recognized by Judge Posner in Nader 
v. Keith,77 the ballot access petition is often subject to a burdensome 
validation procedure that is aimed at verifying that all signatures are 
authentic and comply with the complex state regulations.78 When 
states institute rigorous validation procedures, the actual number of 
signatures required may be much larger than the formal number 
stated in the statute, as candidates are forced to submit additional 
signatures to hedge against the risk that some will be invalidated.79 
As ballot access requirements become more technical and 
cumbersome and validation proceedings more unforgiving, it 
becomes much harder for a candidate to know in advance how many 
additional signatures are needed.80 For example, in the Keith case, 
approximately one-third of Nader’s signatures were invalidated.81 
 
 73. For a detailed chart of 2004 ballot access requirements see Richard Winger, 2004 
Petitioning for President, Ballot Access News (September 1, 2004), http://www.ballot-
access.org/2004/0901.html#11. See generally E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, VOTER CHOICE ’96: 
A 50-STATE REPORT CARD ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (Brennan Center 1996). 
 74. For instance, Minnesota required the petition to be circulated within a two-week 
period, while California required a twenty-four day period. See Smith, supra note 71, at 177 
n.53; Winger, supra note 72, at 176. 
 75. For instance, some states required the petition to be filed by June of an election year 
(Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, and North Carolina). See Winger, supra note 72, at 192 
(containing a chart presenting the evolution of the petition deadlines in the fifty states). 
 76. For examples of the various procedural requirements, see generally Mark R. Brown, 
Policing Ballot Access: Lessons from Nader’s 2004 Run for President, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 163, 
178–216 (2006). For a general survey of these burdensome requirements, see Smith, supra 
note 71, at 176–77. 
 77. 385 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 78. See Robert Yablon, Validation Procedures and the Burden of Ballot Access 
Regulations, 115 YALE L.J. 1833, 1835–38 (2006). 
 79. Id. at 1835–36; see also NORRIS, supra note 48, at 90. 
 80. Yablon, supra note 78, at 1837. 
 81. Nader, 385 F.3d at 734. 
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The Supreme Court has generally afforded wide latitude to the 
states in devising ballot access laws.82 The Court has provided that 
states may require candidates to demonstrate “a significant modicum 
of support” before allowing them access to the ballot.83 For example, 
the Supreme Court has upheld a Georgia ballot access law that 
required independent candidates to obtain signatures from five 
percent of registered voters to qualify for the ballot.84 It has also 
upheld various procedural requirements relating to the signature-
petition process, such as the disqualification of voters who had voted 
in a party primary from signing a ballot access petition for another 
party, a requirement that all signatures be notarized, and a limitation 
of the signature-gathering period to fifty-five days.85 
Nevertheless, in certain cases, when the ballot access laws were 
deemed particularly burdensome, the Court has intervened. For 
example, the Court has held that an Ohio ballot access law was 
unconstitutional because it required third parties to obtain signatures 
totaling fifteen percent of the number of ballots cast in the last 
gubernatorial election.86 This provision made it “virtually impossible 
for any party to qualify on the ballot except the Republican and 
Democratic Parties.”87 The Court has also struck down a ballot 
access law that required the ballot access petition to be filed by 
March of an election year, before the state primary, and almost eight 
months before the general election.88 
2. Anti-fusion laws 
State anti-fusion laws impose another notable barrier upon 
independent candidates and minor parties. Fusion candidates are 
candidates who become the nominee of two parties, usually a major 
party and a minor party. Fusion ballots, which allow multiple listings 
 
 82. See generally Evseev, supra note 70, at 1287–95; Oliver Hall, Death by a Thousand 
Signatures: The Rise of Restrictive Ballot Access Laws and the Decline of Electoral Competition in 
the United States, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407, 424–38 (2005). 
 83. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); see Richard Winger, The Supreme 
Court and the Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical Review of Jenness v. Fortson, 1 ELECTION L.J. 
235 (2002) (criticizing the Jenness decision and the wide latitude that is afforded to states in 
devising ballot access laws); see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 40, at 683–87. 
 84. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438. 
 85. Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 786 (1974). 
 86. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983). 
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of candidates or separate listings of parties on the ballot, are the most 
effective form of fusion.89 
The ability to nominate a fusion candidate is an important means 
by which a minor party can gain political power. The significance of 
fusion for minor parties is two-fold. First, it allows a minor party that 
supports a major party candidate to give some indication as to its 
true force in the ballot.90 When the votes are counted, the minor 
party can demonstrate its relative power by showing how many 
voters voted for the candidate on its “line.”91 This power may allow 
the minor party to attain a stronger bargaining position in future 
electoral campaigns when it demands concessions from a major party 
candidate in exchange for its support.92 Second, fusion enables 
serious minor parties to survive across elections by obtaining 
sufficient votes to assure automatic ballot access in the next electoral 
campaign. Hence, the fusion candidacy allows the minor party to 
overcome the significant hurdle of attaining sufficient signatures to 
be included on the ballot—a task that a minor party normally faces in 
every electoral campaign.93 
The importance of fusion ballots for the survival and success of 
minor parties led the two major parties to adopt restrictive measures 
to eliminate this phenomenon. In the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, after the Australian 
government-issued ballot was introduced, states quickly outlawed 
fusion candidates.94 Although the major parties portrayed these anti-
fusion laws as a necessary means to prevent voter confusion and 
electoral fraud,95 the laws were generally perceived, and sometimes 
explicitly presented, as means to weaken minor parties.96 Currently 
fusion is legal in only a few states. All other states have adopted some 
 
 89. See generally Argersinger, supra note 66; Scarrow, supra note 37. 
 90. Scarrow, supra note 37, at 637. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 637. 
 93. Pildes, supra note 44, at 118. 
 94. Scarrow, supra note 37, at 637–38. 
 95. Id. at 639. 
 96. Argersinger, supra note 66, at 303 (“As the attorney general of one state noted, the 
antifusion law should have been renamed ‘an act to keep the Populists in the middle of the 
road’. . . . By preventing effective fusion, antifusion laws also brought an end . . . to the 
importance and even existence of significant third parties.”). 
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form of anti-fusion law.97 New York, however, marks an interesting 
exception as the New York Court of Appeals held in 1911 that anti-
fusion laws were unconstitutional, and fusion candidates have been 
common.98 As a result, minor parties continue to play a significant 
role in New York politics: three minor parties have official party 
status in New York,99 and their support proved crucial in various 
electoral campaigns on the federal and state level.100 
3. Resulting effect 
The combined effect of these numerous ballot access regulations 
has been devastating for minor and extremist parties. For example, in 
Georgia, due to ballot access requirements, no minor party candidate 
has made it to the ballot for the House of Representatives since 
1942.101 Similarly, since 1964, no independent candidate for the 
House of Representatives has achieved ballot listing in North 
Carolina or South Carolina.102 Indeed, in some cases, the ballot 
access regulations may deter a party or a candidate from even 
attempting to be included on the ballot.103 But even if it does not 
operate as a deterrent, the ballot access regulations significantly drain 
the already limited resources of minor party candidates. For instance, 
in the 1980 presidential election, third-party candidate John 
Anderson had to spend more than half of his campaign budget just 
getting on the ballot on all fifty states.104 In many cases, even 
relatively successful minor-party candidates fail to overcome these 
burdensome requirements. For example, in 2004, presidential 
candidate Ralph Nader did not qualify for the ballot in states 
containing half of the electorate. Furthermore, even if the minor 
party meets these onerous requirements, it may have to repeat the 
 
 97. See Elizabeth Garrett, Book Review: Thus Always Two Tyrants?, 2 ELECTION L.J. 
285, 294 (2003). 
 98. See Elissa Berger, A Party That Won’t Spoil, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1391 
(2005); Scarrow, supra note 37, at 639. 
 99. Namely, the Independence party, Conservative party, and Working Families party. 
 100. Berger, supra note 98, at 1391–92. 
 101. See Winger, supra note 72, at 184. 
 102. See Hall, supra note 82, at 439. 
 103. NORRIS, supra note 48, at 90; ROSENKRANZ, supra note 73, at 12. 
 104. ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 24; Winger, supra note 72, at 184 
(“Furthermore, if ballot access laws were lenient, the amount of money available to the 
Libertarian Party (that now must be spent on expensive paid petition drives) would be used 
instead for campaign advertising.”). 
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process again in the next election cycle if its candidate fails to achieve 
the certain percentage of the vote that grants automatic inclusion on 
the ballot in the next election.105 
For minor parties, there is a lot to be gained by mere inclusion 
on the ballot, even if minor parties’ chances of actually winning an 
election under an FPTP system are quite slim. As various scholars 
have noted, under an FPTP system, the main function of minor 
parties is to act as a check upon the major parties by exposing them 
to competitive pressures.106 First, the minor parties allow voters to 
express their disapproval with a major party, even if voters are not 
willing to vote for their main competitor—the other major party.107 
Moreover, the minor party may introduce different viewpoints and 
policy innovations that are absent from the centralized ideological 
map that is created by the two major parties.108 Even if the minor 
party only poses a threat of being a “spoiler,” the leverage it gains 
from this position may force the major party to make policy (or 
other) concessions to the minor party in order to draw voters 
back.109 The absence of minor parties on the ballot obviously 
removes this competitive pressure.  
Interestingly, as is the case with the FPTP system, the onerous 
ballot access requirements facing a minor party in the United States 
are not a constitutional requirement or a logical necessity. 
Admittedly, some ballot access requirements are necessary and serve 
legitimate interests, such as maintaining order, avoiding voter 
confusion and deception, preventing frivolous candidates from over-
crowding the ballot, and blocking “vanity” candidates.110 However, 
these purposes could be achieved with much less demanding 
requirements, both in terms of number of signatures and complexity 
 
 105. See Gary D. Allison, Protecting Our Nation’s Political Duopoly: The Supremes Spoil 
the Libertarians’ Party, 41 TULSA L. REV. 291, 313 (2005). 
 106. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 40, at 680. 
 107. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 5–6. 
 108. Id. at 8. 
 109. See James Gray Pope, Fusion, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, and the 
Future of Third Parties in the United States, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 473, 491–504 (1998) 
(demonstrating the role played by minor parties in an FPTP system through the example of 
New York State which has several successful minor parties). 
 110. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); Winger, supra note 72, at 182 n.85 
(explaining that “vanity candidates” are candidates who place “his or her name on a ballot even 
though the individual has the backing of no group, and lacks name-recognition or resources to 
sell any causes or ideas he or she may espouse”). 
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of regulations.111 Indeed, the ballot access barrier in the United 
States is significantly higher than any other liberal democracy. In 
comparison, Great Britain requires each candidate for the House of 
Commons to submit ten signatures and pay a filing fee of £500 to 
get on the ballot. Canada requires a candidate for parliament to 
submit 100 signatures and a deposit of C$1000. Austria and 
Belgium require 200–500 signatures per electoral district.112 
The combination of an FPTP system and stringent ballot access 
regulations has resulted in a radical decline in the power of minor 
parties in the United States. It seems safe to say that minor parties 
have been practically eliminated from the political arena in the 
United States.113 In light of the previous conclusions regarding the 
strong correlation between minor parties and extremism, it is clear 
that the elimination of minor parties also means that extremist 
parties have in effect been eliminated from the electoral arena.114 
Indeed, as opposed to other countries, the American electoral system 
does not have a social-democratic party, a green party, a religious 
party or a radical right-wing party. Instead, the electoral landscape 
consists of two relatively moderate major parties that reflect a broad-
based ideological agenda.115 The American electoral arena is 
effectively closed to extremists or even to more moderate parties that 
do not accept the ideological consensus of the two major parties. 
The preceding account gives rise to two obvious responses. First, 
one could argue that the structural features of the electoral system 
that limit extremists are not intentional, but merely incidental effects 
of achieving other goals. In this respect the limitations could be 
treated like other indirect burdens upon free speech that do not 
warrant special attention, like “environmental and minimum wage 
laws that raise the price of newspapers, thus dampening public 
 
 111. Winger, supra note 72, at 182–83 (arguing that a 5000 signature requirement is 
sufficient to prevent over-crowding of the ballot without excessively burdening minor party 
candidates). 
 112. See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 48, at 90; Winger, supra note 72, at 179. 
 113. JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY—THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 101 (2003); Scarrow, supra note 37, at 644; Pildes, supra note 44, at 119. 
 114. See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 48, at 94 (“Restrictions range from cumbersome and 
onerous administrative requirements for third parties to register and obtain ballot access in the 
United States to constitutional bans on extremist parties and legal regulations covering hate 
crimes found in some Western European states.”). 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 39–46. 
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debate.”116 Second, one might argue that in fact, the electoral system 
is not closed to extremists at all. The system merely blocks extremists 
from operating within independent parties, and instead, it channels 
extremists to operate within one of the major parties.117 
Both of these responses warrant discussion. To begin, Part V will 
address the first response and demonstrate that, to a considerable 
extent, the previously discussed structural barriers were intentionally 
introduced to combat extremism. Part VI will examine the validity of 
the second response and show how the major parties limit extremists 
seeking to operate within their ranks, and close the only effective 
avenue for extremist participation and representation in the electoral 
system. 
V. INTENTIONAL USE OF STRUCTURAL FEATURES 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
acknowledged and endorsed the two-party system. The Court’s most 
explicit acknowledgment came in a decision concerning a challenge 
to an anti-fusion statute adopted in Minnesota. In Timmons v. Twin 
Cities,118 the Court rejected the challenge and held that the statute 
was constitutional. More importantly, however, the Court held, for 
the first time explicitly, that to protect political stability, a state can 
pass electoral regulations that “may, in practice, favor the traditional 
two-party system”119 without offending the First Amendment. The 
Court had expressed the same attitude more cautiously in previous 
decisions.120 
In endorsing the two-party system, the Court did not explicitly 
acknowledge the effect this system has upon extremist parties; but 
rather, it emphasized other benefits of the system. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained in Timmons that the two-party system 
“temper[s] the destabilizing effects of party splintering and excessive 
 
 116. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 105 
(1987); see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1175, 1178 (1996). 
 117. See infra Part VI.A. 
 118. 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
 119. See id. at 367. 
 120. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The stabilizing effects of such a [two-party] system are obvious.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
U.S. 109, 144–45 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[The two-party system] has 
contributed enormously to sound and effective government.”).  
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factionalism.”121 In Davis v. Bandemer, Justice O’Connor 
emphasized that the two-party system contributes “to sound and 
effective government.”122 Similarly, Justice Breyer explained that the 
FPTP system “diminish[es] the need for coalition governments. And 
that fact makes it easier for voters to identify which party is 
responsible for government decision-making (and which rascals to 
throw out), while simultaneously providing greater legislative 
stability.”123 
Nowhere can we find in these statements an acknowledgement 
of the effect the two-party system has upon extremists or upon the 
ideological landscape. Although it appears that coded terms like 
“stability” or “factionalism” reflect hostility towards outliers and 
extremists, there is no direct reference to this result. In fact, it 
appears that the only explicit admission of the ideological effect this 
electoral structure has upon extremists can be found in Judge 
Posner’s opinion in Nader v. Keith.124 There, Judge Posner admitted 
that “[a] multiplication of parties would make our politics more 
ideological by reducing the influence of the median voter (who in a 
two-party system determines the outcome of most elections), and 
this could be a very bad thing.”125 
Thus, according to the account presented so far, it seems fair to 
say that even if the Court is aware of the effect of the electoral 
system upon extremists, its assumption is that this effect was not 
intentional. The focus has been upon maintaining stability; 
accountability and effective government and the elimination of 
extremist representation was merely an incidental effect of achieving 
these other goals. Yet, even if this account represents the current 
understanding of the various barriers facing extremists, it simply does 
not conform to historical reality. In fact, when ballot access 
requirements were introduced for the first time in the late 1880s 
with the adoption of the Australian government-printed ballot, the 
initial requirements were relatively minimal.126 The stringent 
 
 121. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367. 
 122. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144–45 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 123. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 357 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
Richard L. Hasen, Do the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
815, 818 (2001); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 40, at 678. 
 124. 385 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 125. Id. at 733. 
 126. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 19–20. 
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requirements were introduced only later; and it is quite apparent that 
one of the main reasons for their adoption was the threat of 
extremist parties, primarily the Communist Party. 
A. Ballot Access Laws 
The first major wave of ballot access laws that imposed significant 
substantive requirements upon minor parties arose in the late 1910s 
and 1920s. This wave was primarily motivated by the “red scare” 
that followed World War I and by the relative success of Roosevelt’s 
Progressive Party127 in 1912.128 By the mid-1920s, state ballot access 
laws were already considered a burden upon minor and extremist 
parties.129 However, a more significant surge in restrictive ballot 
access requirements occurred during the 1930s and 1940s as fear of 
Communism continued to intensify.130 There is little doubt that the 
growth of the Communist Party—an extremist party that was seen as 
a threat to the democratic regime—was a major impetus behind 
adopting such a restrictive regime.131 In many cases, the ballot access 
requirements were restrictive enough to effectively ban the 
Communist Party (and other extremist parties and candidates). In 
addition, in states where the Communist Party succeeded in 
gathering the required number of signatures, substantial efforts were 
made to disqualify a sufficient number of signatures so that their 
 
 127. Roosevelt’s Progressive Party was obviously not considered an extremist party. 
 128. See Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and the Ballot Box: Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
and Ballot Access for Independent Candidates, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 281, 287–88 (1993) (“State 
legislatures, frightened by Roosevelt’s strong showing and by the post-World War I stirrings of 
the Communist Party, enacted new, or fortified existing ballot access laws during the late 
1910’s and early 1920’s.”); see also Hall, supra note 82, at 418. 
 129. See Chris Hocker, Legal Barriers to Third Parties, 10 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 125, 126 (1980–1981); Smith, supra note 71, at 174. 
 130. See RASKIN, supra note 113, at 101; Kevin Cofsky, Pruning the Political Thicket: The 
Case for Strict Scrutiny of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 360 n.22 
(1996) (“Modern ballot access restrictions are commonly viewed as having developed as a 
response to the success of the Progressive Party and the Socialist Party in the 1912 elections 
and fear of the Communist Party in the 1930s and 1940s.”); Porto, supra note 128, at 288; 
Smith, supra note 71, at 174. 
 131. See RASKIN, supra note 113, at 101; Porto, supra note 128, at 287–288 (“In the 
1930’s and 1940’s, states enacted a second set of restrictive ballot access statutes, some of 
which explicitly banned the Communist Party. Others stopped at making ballot access more 
difficult for Communist and other non-traditional party and independent candidates by 
requiring large numbers of signatures on nominating petitions.”); Winger, supra note 83, at 
237. 
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petition would be rejected altogether. Indeed, accounts written at 
the time note specifically that 
state action to prevent infiltration of Communists into vital 
positions has been exercised primarily through control of the 
ballot. Inability to satisfy petition requirements for a place on the 
ballot or to poll a sufficient number of votes to qualify 
automatically for successive elections keeps the Communist Party 
off the ballot in a number of jurisdictions.132 
As another commentator noted, “[T]he method commonly 
resorted to [to keep the party off the ballots] prior to World War II 
was the indirect attack aimed at nomination petitions circulated by 
the party.”133 By the elections of 1936, these efforts achieved relative 
success, leaving the Communist Party off the ballot in fifteen 
states.134 In the elections of 1940, efforts to keep the Communist 
Party off the ballot through stringent ballot access requirements 
continued. In four states (New York, New Hampshire, Maryland, 
and West Virginia), the Communist Party was banned from the 
ballot even though it achieved the necessary signatures because the 
signatures were discovered to be fraudulently acquired.135 
Three examples of states that adopted stringent ballot access laws 
emphasize this intentional targeting of the Communist Party. 
Indeed, in all of these states stringent ballot access laws came as an 
obvious response to the success of the Communist Party or 
candidates associated with communism. The most notable example 
occurred in Illinois where the state legislature’s hostility towards the 
Communist Party led to a reform of the ballot access requirements in 
two stages. In 1931, the state legislature raised the petition signature 
requirement for statewide office from 1000 to 25,000 signatures. 
 
 132. Note, Control of Communist Activities, 1 STAN. L. REV. 85, 90 (1948). 
 133. Note, Restraints on American Communist Activities, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 388 
(1948); see also Hugh A. Bone, Small Political Parties: Casualties of War?, 32 NAT’L MUN. 
REV. 524, 525 (1943) (“[E]ven before the outbreak of war in 1939, the American public was 
becoming increasingly suspicious of alien influences, ‘isms,’ and fifth column activity. There 
has been a tendency to associate subversive influences with minor political groups and this in 
turn has led to agitation to keep their names off the ballot.”); Note, The Legal Status of the 
Communist Party, 34 VA. L. REV. 450, 450 (1948) (“[T]he states have aimed the brunt of 
their anti-Communist legislation at keeping the Party off the ballot.”). 
 134. Note, Limitations on Access to the General Election Ballot, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 86, 
86 n.2 (1937). Similar results were observed in the 1940 presidential elections. See Harry F. 
Ward, The Communist Party and the Ballot, 1 BILL RTS. REV. 286, 287 (1940–1941). 
 135. Note, The Legal Status of the Communist Party, supra note 133, at 451.  
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Despite this dramatic reform, the Communist Party succeeded in 
gaining ballot access in the following year. Determined to limit 
Communist Party participation, the Illinois legislature in 1935 added 
a requirement that 200 signatures must be collected from each of the 
fifty counties.136 This requirement was especially damaging to the 
Communist Party as its base of support was concentrated in two 
counties (Cook, which included the city of Chicago, and Peoria), 
and it had much less support in the rural counties of Illinois.137 The 
Communist Party attacked the constitutionality of this restrictive 
ballot access statute, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the Communist Party’s petition and upheld the 
statute.138 The effect of this change was devastating upon the party 
and led to its exclusion from the ballot in the 1936 elections and to 
the disappearance of the Communist Party from the political 
landscape of Illinois for many years.139 
In Florida, after the Communist Party received around 1.5% of 
the vote in the 1928 Presidential elections, a new ballot access 
statute was adopted in 1931 that severely limited the ability of minor 
parties to gain ballot access.140 The Communist Party failed in its 
attempt to challenge the amendment in court.141 As a result, the 
Communist Party did not qualify and was not included on the ballot 
in the 1932 Presidential elections. 
Finally, in 1947, the Ohio state legislature amended its election 
code to require a political party that wished to present a presidential 
candidate to submit a petition including signatories that equal fifteen 
 
 136. I wish to thank ballot access expert Richard Winger for providing me with this 
chronology. E-mail from Richard Winger to author (Mar. 24, 2008) (on file with author). 
 137. Bone, supra note 133, at 525 (explaining that both in 1938 and 1940 the 
Communists gathered the sufficient number of signatures but did not achieve the required 
distribution of signatures). 
 138. Blackman v. Stone, 101 F.2d 500, 503–04 (7th Cir. 1939). The constitutionality of 
this statute was also later upheld by the Supreme Court in MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 
287 (1948). Only thirty years later, in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 817–19 (1969), was it 
finally invalidated. 
 139. ROSENKRANZ, supra note 73, at 14. 
 140. DAVID REYNOLDS, DEMOCRACY UNBOUND: PROGRESSIVE CHALLENGES TO THE 
TWO PARTY SYSTEM 278 (1997); Comment, Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success, 57 YALE 
L.J. 1276, 1282 (1948); see also Winger, supra note 73, at 194–95 (utilizing a chart to 
document the evolution of signature requirements in the fifty states, which states that the 
signature requirement in Florida was zero in 1928 and 28,767 in 1932).  
 141. See State ex rel. Barnett v. Gray, 144 So. 349, 353–54 (Fla. 1932).  
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percent of the last gubernatorial vote.142 This meant a party had to 
submit over 400,000 signatures to gain access to the ballot.143 The 
main motivation for this amendment was to block Henry Wallace, a 
former vice president and the Progressive Party candidate.144 Wallace 
was subject to special hostility because of the support and 
endorsement he received from the Communist Party and because of 
allegations (some of them true) that Communists were strongly 
involved in his campaign.145 Although Wallace managed to 
circumvent this amendment in the 1948 elections,146 the “loophole” 
he used was sealed and no third-party succeeded in gaining access to 
the Ohio presidential ballot until 1968, when the Supreme Court 
ruled that the restrictive ballot access law was unconstitutional.147 
B. First-Past-the-Post 
In contrast to the ballot access requirements, the FPTP system in 
the United States was not specifically designed to limit extremist 
parties. In adopting the FPTP system, the founding fathers were not 
focused at all on creating a two-party system or on limiting extremist 
parties.148 In fact, no deliberative decision was made to choose FPTP 
over a PR electoral system. At the time, the concept of a PR electoral 
structure had not yet been conceived, and in effect the FPTP was the 
only system with which the designers were familiar.149 However, this 
viewpoint neutrality changed in the twentieth century when 
Americans grew familiar with the PR electoral system. Starting in 
 
 142. Richard Winger, Ballot Format: Must Candidates Be Treated Equally?, 45 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 87, 91–92 (1997). Another, less significant, target of this amendment was the Socialist 
Labor Party, an extremist party that made a surprising showing in the 1946 mid-term 
elections. Id. at 90–91. 
 143. Winger, supra note 83, at 195 (charting the evolution of signature requirements in 
the fifty states).  
 144. Winger, supra note 142, at 91–92.  
 145. KARL M. SCHMIDT, HENRY A. WALLACE: QUIXOTIC CRUSADE 1948, 252–80, 259 
(1960) (“But while these may have been the facts . . . they were ultimately far less important 
than the public image . . . . And in 1948, 51 percent of the American public . . . ‘agreed that’ 
the Wallace third party was Communist-dominated.”). 
 146. Winger, supra note 142, at 92. 
 147. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1968); see Winger, supra note 83, at 237 
(“During the mid-1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court began taking an activist role in election 
law.”). 
 148. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 40, at 676–78.  
 149. See id. at 677 (explaining that Belgium became the first country to adopt PR in 
1899). 
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1915 and intensifying later in the 1930s and 1940s, the Progressive 
Movement led an effort for electoral reform and especially for 
adopting some version of PR.150 Their aim was to fight corruption 
and limit the power of local party bosses.151 At the movement’s 
height, two dozen American city councils used a form of PR called 
single transferable vote (STV),152 including New York City, 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, and smaller cities mainly in New York, Ohio, 
and Massachusetts.153 In some cities, like most of the cities in Ohio, 
the PR system did not create a multi-party system; but in more 
diverse cities, like New York, the change did in fact transform the 
electoral landscape.154 For instance, in New York the PR system 
enabled three new minor parties to gain significant representation on 
the city council: the American Labor Party, the Fusion Party, and the 
Communist Party.155  
This conversion to a PR system was short-lived. The major 
parties fought hard to repeal the PR system and return to the 
previous FPTP system; by the late 1950s, the PR system practically 
disappeared from the municipal landscape.156 Importantly, at least in 
New York, this brief episode brought to light an explicit intention to 
adopt the FPTP system as a means to block participation of extremist 
parties, most significantly the Communist Party. Indeed, historical 
accounts of the repeal of PR in New York City in 1947 repeatedly 
state that the relative success of the Communist Party under the PR 
system was the main reason for the return to the FPTP system.157 
The campaign to repeal the PR system in New York City openly 
described the PR system as “an un-American practice which has 
 
 150. Douglas J. Amy, A Brief History of Proportional Representation in the United States, 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/Brief%20History%20of%20PR.htm 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
 151. Id. 
 152. For an explanation of the STV system see Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the 
Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 418, 435–41 (1995).  
 153. Amy, supra note 150. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Belle Zeller & Hugh A. Bone, The Repeal of P.R. in New York City—Ten Years in 
Retrospect, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1127, 1132 (1948).  
 156. The only jurisdictions in America still employing STV are Cambridge, Massachusetts 
and the New York City community school board system. See Briffault, supra note 152, at 435 
n.61. 
 157. Zeller & Bone, supra note 155, at 1133–34; Robert J. Kolesar, Communism, Race, 
and the Defeat of Proportional Representation in Cold War America, www.mtholyoke.edu/ 
acad/polit/damy/articles/kolesar.htm. 
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helped the cause of communism.” It further explained that the 
return to FPTP was necessary to block Communist representation.158 
And as expected, the return to FPTP in 1947 not only succeeded in 
eliminating the Communist Party from the city council, but 
completely eradicated all minor-party representation.159 
C. Conclusion 
It is clear that not all of the barriers facing extremists in the 
electoral arena were intentionally targeted at extremist participation. 
Indeed, although this Part has highlighted the intentional aspect of 
several of these restrictions, it would obviously be misleading to 
describe all limitations upon minor parties as an indirect effort to 
suppress extremism. Nonetheless, the account presented so far is still 
important for two main reasons. First, it demonstrates that the use of 
seemingly neutral electoral regulations to battle specific extremist 
threats is not merely a theoretical-academic exercise but rather a 
practical matter. These mechanisms actually work, and legislators 
across the United States have used them effectively and consciously 
against extremist parties. 
Second, and more importantly, as I will further detail below,160 
this historical account should lead to added awareness in current 
discussion of electoral regulations. As Justice Stevens explained in his 
dissent in Timmons, “[a]lthough the State is not required now to 
justify its laws with exclusive reference to the original purpose behind 
their passage . . . this history does provide some indication of the 
kind of burden the States themselves believed they were imposing on 
the smaller parties’ effective association.”161 But before examining 
the practical implications of this account, this Article will examine a 
second, even more important response, to the claims presented thus 
far.  
 
 158. Kolesar, supra note 157. The Communists were represented on the city council 
initially by one councilmember (in 1941), but two years later they succeeded in electing 
another Communist to the city council, and thus held two out of seventeen council members. 
See Zeller & Bone, supra note 155, at 1132. 
 159. See Kolesar, supra note 157. 
 160. See infra Part VII.C. 
 161. Timmons v. Twin Cities, 520 U.S. 351, 378 n.6 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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VI. EXCLUSION OF EXTREMISTS FROM MAJOR PARTIES 
The best response to the claim that the American electoral 
system is closed to extremist participation focuses on the alternative 
avenue open to any minor party candidate (including extremists)—
competition within a major party. This Part will first explain the 
nature of American major parties and the extent to which they offer 
an avenue of participation and representation for various factions and 
interest groups. Thereafter, it will proceed to show that the 
opportunity to operate within the major party is not open to all 
factions. Specifically, this Part will examine cases in which the major 
parties excluded extremist candidates from participation in the 
party’s nomination process. It will then attempt to categorize what 
types of extremists are particularly targeted for exclusion from major 
parties. The Part will close with an assessment of the overall effect of 
the series of barriers that face extremists within the electoral arena. 
A. The “Big Tent” Party 
While the American electoral arena is generally hostile toward 
minor parties, it is commonly assumed that the major parties are 
quite open to various factions that wish to participate in the electoral 
competition within the major party.162 In fact, the supporters of the 
existing two-party system claim that the channeling of different 
groups into the two major parties is one of the major advantages of 
the American electoral system.163 This channeling forces the various 
factions to form coalitions and compromises before the elections; it 
 
 162. See LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 244 (1986) 
(“[T]he direct-primary laws of the several states provide unusual opportunities for insurgents 
to win major-party nominations and thereby the valuable state-conferred labels accompanying 
those nominations. Challengers outside the ranks of an established party leadership and 
organization are thus encouraged to seek intraparty electoral routes to power . . . .”); BIBBY & 
MAISEL, supra note 43, at 58 (“The pervasive use of the direct primary system in all of the 
states has had the effect of channeling dissent into the two major parties.”). 
 163. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 174–75 (2003) (“Even 
though ideological parties in a multiparty system may reappear as factions within parties in a 
two-parties system, their strength will be diluted because a faction in one party cannot credibly 
threaten to form a governing coalition with a faction of another party. Each party must select a 
platform and candidates that appeal to the swing voters, and thus must curb its ideological 
extremes.”); Steven G. Calabresi, Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German to the 
U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 78 (2001) (“Forcing the extreme right or left to 
submerge itself in and be tamed by one of two centrist parties is important to preventing a re-
emergence of the political dynamics of the 1920’s and 1930’s . . . .”). 
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“moderates the course of party action” and encourages “the 
tendency . . . to avoid extreme policies.”164 This tendency is a direct 
result of the process of coalition building within the major parties. 
First, the various factions coalescing to form a major party have to 
accommodate each other and moderate their positions in order to 
cooperate within one major party.165 In addition, as the party still has 
to appeal to the median voter, it cannot present an extremist face. It 
has to rein in its “radical” elements and agree to a relatively centrist 
position.166 Some proponents of this approach even argue that “a 
system that channels its choices into two pluralistic catch-all parties is 
just as democratic as one with multiple minor parties, and it is no less 
respectful of free choice.”167 
According to this view, an environmentalist group that wishes to 
influence the electoral arena should operate as a lobby or interest 
group, probably within the Democratic Party, rather than running 
separately like the German “Green Party.” As a result, the other 
factions of the party (for instance trade unions) will moderate the 
group’s more extreme positions regarding the environment, but the 
environmental group will still influence and shape the position 
presented by the Democratic Party as a whole. Similarly, a Christian 
religious faction that seeks to participate in the electoral arena, rather 
than running as a separate party (like the Jewish National Religious 
Party in Israel) will join the Republican Party and operate as an 
organized bloc within that party. It will influence the party’s agenda, 
but it will have to compromise somewhat with other factions in the 
party that are more liberal regarding religious issues (for instance, 
libertarians). 
Of course, this system of representation is far from flawless. A 
major party that is a result of compromises between various groups 
will typically reflect a mish-mash of factions and ideologies. It will 
 
 164. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 39, at 85. 
 165. Id. (“To make extreme concessions to one interest at the expense of the others is 
likely to be fatal to the alignment of interests that make up the constituency of a major party. 
The process moderates the course of party action.”). 
 166. SABATO, supra note 45, at 12 (“The party tames its own extreme elements by 
pulling them toward an ideological center in order to attract a majority of votes on election 
day.”). 
 167. Bruce E. Cain, An Ethical Path to Reform: Just Elections Considered, 4 ELECTION 
L.J. 134, 137 (2005). 
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probably not reflect the “pure” political views of any of its voters.168 
The extremist voters in particular may compromise more of their 
views within the coalition building process than other factions in the 
party. These extremists may feel that they are not adequately 
represented by the major party they have joined. 
In any case, it is clear that this mechanism provides an alternative 
only for factions and candidates that are allowed to operate freely 
within the major party. If the major party’s organization imposes 
restrictive rules that prevent segments of the party electorate from 
placing their candidate on the primary ballot or from participating in 
electing the party’s candidates, these excluded factions are effectively 
blocked. They are prevented from running within a separate minor 
party and are excluded from participating in the electoral process 
within the major party. And, indeed, recent years have witnessed 
precisely this development. Major parties have used the power 
granted to them as an expressive association to exclude extremists 
explicitly on the basis of their viewpoint. 
B. Exclusion of Extremists from Major Parties 
Since 1992, the two major parties excluded three candidates—
two of them presidential candidates—from party nomination 
processes, on the basis of their extremist viewpoint: (1) David Duke 
by the Republican Party in Georgia, Florida, and Rhode Island169 in 
1992; (2) Lyndon LaRouche by the Democratic Party in 1996, 
2000 and 2004; and (3) Frazier Miller by the Democratic Party in 
Missouri in 2006.170 Thus far, all cases dealing with these exclusions 
have been decided in District Courts and the Federal Courts of 
Appeals. The Supreme Court has not directly weighed in on the 
matter. 
 
 168. See Douglas J. Amy, Entrenching the Two-Party System: The Supreme Court’s Fusion 
Decision, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 149, 164–65 (David 
K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002) (describing the tendency of multi-party electoral systems to yield 
significantly greater voter turnout and explaining that increased turnout occurs because “it is 
much easier for voters to find a candidate or party that actually reflects their particular political 
views”). 
 169. The attempt to exclude David Duke from the Rhode Island primary ballot failed. See 
infra text accompanying note 191. 
 170. Frazier Miller was a white supremacist from Missouri who was denied access to the 
Democratic primary ballot for the office of U.S. Representative for Missouri’s Seventh District. 
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1. David Duke 
David Duke, a member of the Ku Klux Klan from Louisiana, first 
ran for office as a candidate in the Democratic Party. He failed to get 
elected as a Democratic candidate for the Louisiana Senate (in 1975 
and 1979) and failed in the 1988 Democratic presidential primaries. 
After his 1988 primary failure, he ran as the Populist Party candidate 
for President in 1988.171 After the election, Duke switched to the 
Republican Party, and in 1989 he was elected to the Louisiana state 
legislature as a Republican.172 One year later, Duke ran for the U.S. 
Senate as a Republican. Fear of a Duke victory led the other 
Republican candidate in Louisiana’s open primary to withdraw from 
the race and transfer his support to the Democratic incumbent, J. 
Bennett Johnston.173 Although Johnston won re-election, Duke 
obtained forty-four percent of the vote.174 In 1991, Duke ran again 
as a Republican candidate for Louisiana Governor. In the open 
primary, Duke finished second with thirty-two percent of the vote. 
He lost in the runoff, but gained a substantial following with thirty-
nine percent of the vote.175 
In 1992, when Duke participated in the Republican presidential 
primaries, the state parties of Georgia, Florida, and Rhode Island 
attempted to exclude his name from the primary ballot on the basis 
of his extremist viewpoint. Ultimately Duke was excluded in Georgia 
and Florida and included on the ballot in Rhode Island. This section 
will provide a detailed account of the cases arising out of the Georgia 
exclusion as they dealt more directly and extensively with the issue of 
viewpoint-based exclusion. Thereafter, the section will briefly discuss 
the Florida and Rhode Island cases.176 
The Georgia Republican Party attempted to block Duke’s 
participation on the basis of a state statute that permitted the State 
Candidate Selection Committee to remove a candidate from the 
primary ballot if all Committee members of the same political party 
 
 171. Independents Get Handful of Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1988, at B6. 
 172. Election’s Weight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1989, at E7. 
 173. Peter Applebome, Republican Quits Louisiana Race in Effort to Defeat Ex-
Klansman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1990, at A1. 
 174. The 1990 Elections: State by State; South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B8. 
 175. Peter Applebome, Blacks and Affluent Whites Give Edwards Victory, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 1991, at A1. 
 176. See infra text accompanying notes 191–97. 
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as the candidate voted for the removal. Since all three Republican 
Committee members voted to remove Duke from the ballot (and 
later denied his appeal for reconsideration), his name was dropped 
from the primary ballot.177 Duke challenged the Committee’s 
decision in federal court resulting in a series of cases that the 
Eleventh Circuit ultimately resolved. In the two most significant 
cases, Duke v. Cleland178 and Duke v. Massey,179 two different 
Eleventh Circuit panels rejected Duke’s challenges to the Republican 
Party’s refusal to include him on Georgia’s primary ballot.180 
In Cleland, the court considered Duke’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The Eleventh Circuit made it clear that Duke 
did not have a right to associate with an “unwilling partner,” the 
Republican Party.181 The court also held that the Republican Party 
had a right to “‘identify the people who constitute the association, 
and to limit the association to those people only.’”182 
Later, in Massey, the Eleventh Circuit made a decision on the 
merits. The court again upheld the Republican Party’s action, despite 
an earlier decision holding that the Georgia law constituted state 
action. Applying the two-pronged framework provided by the 
Supreme Court in Burdick v. Takushi183 and Anderson v. 
 
 177. For a detailed account of these events see Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1228–29 
(11th Cir. 1996). In Georgia, a candidate who wants to be on the primary ballot has to be 
approved by the Candidate Selection Committee. There is no petition drive alternative like in 
Rhode Island. See infra note 197. 
 178. 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 179. 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).  
 180. In Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399 (11th Cir. 1993), another case involving the same 
dispute, the court rejected the defendant’s initial motion to dismiss Duke’s claim for failure to 
state a claim. In its decision the court held that Duke’s exclusion constituted “state action.” Id. 
at 1403. 
 181. Cleland, 954 F.2d at 1530. 
 182. Id. at 1531 (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 108 (1981)). 
 183. 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“A court considering a challenge to a state election law 
must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule . . . . 
Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law 
depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ 
restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling 
importance. . . . But when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the 
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.” 
(quotations omitted)). 
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Celebrezze,184 the Massey court first weighed the burden imposed 
upon the rights of Duke and his supporters.185 The court determined 
that they were not “heavily burdened” because Duke did not “have a 
First Amendment right to express his beliefs as a presidential 
candidate for the Republican Party.”186 According to the court, 
Duke’s supporters did not have a right to associate with him as a 
Republican Party candidate, and they “were not foreclosed from 
supporting him as an independent candidate, or as a third-party 
candidate in the general election.”187 
The court then examined the interests of the Republican Party 
and the State in excluding Duke. As to the Republican Party, the 
court held that “[t]he Republican Party has a First Amendment right 
to freedom of association and an attendant right to identify those 
who constitute the party based on political beliefs.”188 As a corollary 
to the Republican Party’s right, the court held that the state has “a 
compelling interest in protecting political parties’ right to define 
their membership.”189 Accordingly, it ruled that the compelling 
interests of the Republican Party and the state trump the burden 
upon the First Amendment rights of Duke and his supporters. As a 
result, the court approved Duke’s exclusion from Georgia’s 
Republican Party primary ballot.190 
In addition to Georgia, Duke was also excluded from the 
primary ballot in Florida and Rhode Island. Duke challenged the 
Rhode Island exclusion in court and won. The court issued a 
preliminary injunction, and he was included on the primary ballot.191 
Duke also challenged his exclusion from the Florida primary ballot, 
but the District Court ruled against him, and he remained off the 
ballot.192 In the subsequent appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed to 
 
 184. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 185. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 186. Id. at 1234. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 1235. 
 191. Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. 50, 54–55 (D.R.I. 1992) (holding that the statute 
determining inclusion on the ballot was unconstitutionally vague “because it provide[d] 
absolutely no standards for the State Party Chairman to follow”). 
 192. Duke v. Smith, 784 F. Supp. 865, 872 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The Florida Republican 
and Democratic Party excluded four candidates, including David Duke and Lyndon LaRouche 
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consider the case despite its mootness and ruled in favor of Duke.193 
The court held that the state statute endowed the presidential 
primary selection committee in Florida with “unfettered discretion” 
in the reconsideration process of excluded candidates.194 
Although the Rhode Island and Florida cases appear to cut 
against Cleland and Massey, their significance should not be 
overstated for two reasons. First, the courts’ main focus in the Rhode 
Island and Florida cases was upon the party leadership’s level of 
discretion, rather than on questions of viewpoint discrimination and 
ideological litmus tests. Thus, the courts in these cases did not 
engage in a substantial analysis and balance between the right of the 
party to define itself and the First Amendment rights of the 
candidates and their supporters.195 Second, in both cases the courts 
were very careful to limit the scope of their rulings. In the Florida 
case, the court was not willing to invalidate the exclusion decision 
itself and limited its ruling to the reconsideration process.196 In the 
Rhode Island case, the court warned that it would not intervene in 
favor of excluded candidates in the future because, according to 
Rhode Island law, a candidate could gain access to the primary ballot 
through a signature petition, thus bypassing the party leadership.197 
 
from participation in the Florida primary. Yet only Duke was explicitly excluded because of his 
viewpoint. Id. at 867. 
 193. Duke v. Smith, 13 F.3d 388, 392 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 194. Id. at 395. 
 195. Despite the different nature of the analysis in these cases, they too seem to reflect 
the inherent difficulty in dealing with these kinds of cases, which go to the heart of the party’s 
right to decide who will represent it. See Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The 
Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L. J. 2181, 2198 (2001) 
(“It is difficult to disentangle this notion of unfettered discretion from the idea of an 
ideological litmus test.”). 
 196. Smith, 13 F.3d at 391 n.3. 
 197. Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. 50, 56 (D.R.I. 1992). In the case of Duke, the court 
was willing to intervene as an exceptional measure because the decision not to include him on 
the ballot came relatively late in the process, and he did not have sufficient time to collect the 
necessary signatures. Id. at 52. A similar line of cases involved “media recognition statutes” 
that allowed party leadership to exempt certain primary candidates from filing petitions if they 
were “generally recognized in the news media.” These cases were typically resolved in favor of 
the party since the candidates that were not exempted were still entitled to file a signature 
petition to get on the primary ballot. See, e.g., LaRouche v. Kezer, 990 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 
1993); Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 811–12 (6th Cir. 1980); LaRouche v. Sheehan, 591 F. 
Supp. 917, 919 (D. Md. 1984). 
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2. Lyndon LaRouche 
Another important decision involved the exclusion of Lyndon 
LaRouche’s delegates from the Democratic convention. Lyndon 
LaRouche is a controversial political figure who presented views that 
have been regarded as racist and even Fascist.198 He first tried to 
enter politics through the U.S. Labor Party in the 1974 mid-term 
elections and the 1976 presidential elections, but he was generally 
unsuccessful, as his party was unable to appear on most state 
ballots.199 After his initial failure as a third-party candidate, LaRouche 
and his supporters tried to get elected through the Democratic 
Party. They had some minor successes. In 1986, for instance, Janice 
Hart and Mark J. Fairchild, candidates backed by LaRouche, won 
the Democratic Primary for Illinois Secretary of State and Lieutenant 
Governor.200 LaRouche himself has participated in all the Democratic 
presidential primaries since 1980 with little electoral success. 
In the 1996 campaign, however, the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) decided to battle LaRouche’s nomination. To 
keep LaRouche off the ballot, the DNC made use of Rule 11(K) of 
its Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National 
Convention (adopted on March 12, 1994) which explicitly stated 
that a Democratic candidate must 
as determined by the Chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee, have established a bona fide record of public service, 
accomplishment, public writings and/or public statements 
affirmatively demonstrating that he or she has the interests, welfare 
and success of the Democratic Party of the United States at heart 
and will participate in the Convention in good faith.201 
 
 198. DENNIS KING, LYNDON LAROUCHE AND THE NEW AMERICAN FASCISM 53 (1989) 
(“Such appears to be LaRouche’s program for a fascist state: dictatorship by the party elite, a 
purge of the ‘Zionists,’ suppression of all opposition, brainwashing-style pressure on those who 
refuse to internalize the party elite’s ideology, denial of citizenship to subhumans, and revisions 
in the criminal code to make it all ‘legal.’”). 
 199. Id. at 86. 
 200. Id. at 103–11. After the LaRouche-backed candidates’ nominations, the Democratic 
candidate for Governor refused to run on the same ticket and decided instead to run as a 
candidate of the Illinois Solidarity Party, enjoying the support of the state Democratic Party. 
Ultimately, the Republican slate won the general elections. Id. at 111. 
 201. LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting the rule and 
explaining that the rule was reaffirmed in January 1995 when the DNC adopted the “Call to 
the 1996 Democratic National Convention” which included a similar provision in Article VI). 
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Under this rule the DNC issued a letter to state Democratic 
Party organizations declaring that LaRouche is not a “bona fide 
Democrat” and therefore not a qualified candidate for nomination as 
President.202 The DNC’s letter explained that this determination is 
based upon LaRouche’s “expressed political beliefs, including beliefs 
which are explicitly racist and anti-Semitic, and otherwise utterly 
contrary to the fundamental beliefs . . . of the Democratic Party and 
. . . on his past activities including exploitation of and defrauding 
contributors and voters.”203 Although LaRouche was not universally 
excluded from primary ballots, the delegates LaRouche won in 
Virginia and Louisiana were excluded from the 1996 Democratic 
convention, and the party effectively blocked LaRouche and his 
supporters from participation in the Texas caucuses, Arizona 
primaries, and District of Columbia caucuses.204 LaRouche 
challenged these actions in federal court, but the District Court for 
the District of Columbia dismissed his claim and the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal.205  
In its careful analysis of the interests at hand, the Circuit Court’s 
main concern was to determine the level of scrutiny that should be 
applied to the case. First, it suggested that even if it were to apply 
the Burdick analysis, which controls state regulation of the electoral 
process, the overall burden imposed on LaRouche by the state “may 
not have been severe enough to require strict scrutiny.”206 The court 
explained that “LaRouche’s adherents still retained the right to 
express their political views by supporting other Democratic 
nominees, even if they could not nominate LaRouche. And 
LaRouche retained the right to run, and his supporters the right to 
vote for him, as either a third-party or independent candidate.”207 
Furthermore, the court explained that it did not believe that the 
Burdick test applies at all to intra-party disputes because in such cases 
“the First Amendment weighs on both sides of the balance,” as 
 
 202. Id. at 976. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 976–77. 
 205. Id. While the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision concerning the 
constitutional claims, it remanded LaRouche’s claim under the Voting Rights Act for 
procedural reasons. On remand the district court rejected LaRouche’s claim under the Voting 
Rights Act. LaRouche v. Fowler, 77 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 206. Fowler, 152 F.3d at 994. 
 207. Id. at 993–94. 
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opposed to most other electoral cases where the First Amendment 
weighs on only one side.208 Finally, the court rejected the claim that 
strict scrutiny should apply because the Democratic Party’s action 
constituted viewpoint discrimination.209 In fact, the court reasoned 
that “it is the sine qua non of a political party that it represent a 
particular political viewpoint. And it is the purpose of a party 
convention to decide on that viewpoint.”210 Therefore, “[u]nlike a 
state, which is largely barred from making such decisions, a political 
party . . . must choose a political viewpoint.”211 
After determining that a strict scrutiny analysis is not warranted 
and after rejecting the applicability of the Burdick analysis, the court 
proceeded to resolve the matter under a very lenient test introduced 
in a previous D.C. Circuit case.212 Under this test, it was relatively 
easy for the court to rule in favor of the Democratic Party and hold 
that at a party convention “the associational rights of the Democratic 
National Party are at their zenith” and that “[t]he Party’s ability to 
define who is a ‘bona fide Democrat’ is nothing less than the Party’s 
ability to define itself.”213 The court also made it clear that “the 
Party’s First Amendment rights extend not only to defining itself, 
but also to determining how to define itself.”214 Hence, the court 
rejected LaRouche’s claim that the manner in which the party chose 
to “define itself” (a decision made by the DNC Chairman) was 
“unfair.”215 
Despite the Fowler decision, LaRouche participated in the 
Democratic Party primary process in the 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections. In both cases the DNC announced that his delegates 
would be barred from the Democratic convention.216 As a result, in 
 
 208. Id. at 994. 
 209. Id. at 995. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. 
 212. Ripon Soc’y. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(determining that a “representational scheme” is constitutional if it “rationally advance[s] 
some legitimate interest of the party in winning elections or otherwise achieving its political 
goals”). 
 213. Fowler, 152 F.3d at 996. 
 214. Id. at 997. 
 215. Id.  
 216. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Political Briefing: A Spot for LaRouche? No Way, Party 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9A06EFD7163EF932A25755C0A9669C8B63; Richard Winger, 
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2000, even though LaRouche received twenty-two percent of the 
primary vote in Arkansas, he was not granted any delegates to the 
convention.217 Probably in light of the Fowler decision, LaRouche 
did not challenge the DNC’s decision in court. In 2004 he received 
only negligible support and was not entitled to any delegates.218 
3. Frazier Glenn Miller 
Most recently, the Democratic Party excluded Frazier Glenn 
Miller, a candidate for Missouri’s Seventh District congressional seat 
from the party’s primary.219 The actual details of this case are 
somewhat less clear than those involving Duke or LaRouche because 
the District Court for the Western District of Missouri rendered the 
only judicial consideration, and the court mainly grounded its 
decision in procedure. In his complaint, Miller alleged that the 
Democratic Party refused to accept his required filing fee, effectively 
eliminating his candidacy.220 Miller claimed that the refusal to 
include him on the primary ballot was due to the party’s decision “to 
exclude people who express pro-White racial viewpoints.”221 And 
indeed, a spokesperson for the Missouri Democratic Party confirmed 
that the party “rejects Miller’s racist views” and stated that “[t]he 
Democratic Party is certainly a big-tent party, but that does not 
include white supremacists.”222 
The District Court dismissed Miller’s suit for failure to state a 
claim.223 The court held that Missouri’s Secretary of State was not 
the proper defendant and that such a claim should have been 
advanced against the Democratic Party itself.224 The court also 
determined that the Secretary of State enjoyed qualified immunity in 
the case because the conduct at question did not “‘violate clearly 
 
Democratic Presidential Primary, Ballot Access News (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.ballot-
access.org/2004/0301.html#13. 
 217. Ayres, supra note 216.  
 218. Winger, supra note 216. 
 219. Miller v. Carnahan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34909, *1–*2 (W.D. Mo. May 31, 
2006). I wish to thank Richard Winger for bringing this case to my attention. 
 220. Id. at *5. 
 221. Id. at *5. 
 222. See Press Release from James Goodwin, Green County Missouri Democrats, 
Democrats Won’t Allow ‘Pro-White’ Candidate, Mar. 12, 2006, available at http:// 
www.greenecountydemocrats.org/story/2006/3/12/74442/7989. 
 223. Miller, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34909 at *7. 
 224. Id. at *6–7.  
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.’”225 In its analysis of the qualified 
immunity issue, the court emphasized that there is no authority 
supporting the conclusion that “a political party can not refuse 
membership to persons who do not share its ideology.”226 Although 
the court was somewhat inaccurate in its statement—this case 
involved a refusal of candidacy rather than membership—it appears 
that its conclusion is consistent with the previous exclusion cases. As 
in Duke or LaRouche, the Miller court had no difficulty in finding 
that a major party was entitled to exclude a candidate from 
participating in the party’s nomination process on the basis of their 
viewpoint. Moreover, as in the previous exclusion cases, the court 
noted that Miller was not denied a “right to the ballot” because he 
could run as an independent candidate.227 Thus, he was merely 
denied the right to the ballot of a specific party.228 After the dismissal 
of his claim, Miller apparently did not further pursue the matter and 
was simply left off the primary ballot. 
C. What Type of Extremists Are Excluded? 
So far, this Article has used the term “extremists” rather broadly, 
without distinguishing between different types of extremism. 
However, upon closer examination it is evident that the extremists 
that are excluded from major parties share certain common 
characteristics. Specifically, all these extremists are not merely 
“relatively” extreme (in comparison to the median voter). Instead 
they are known for their explicitly illiberal, racist, and/or anti-
Semitic views. In her discussion of extremism in American politics, 
Nancy Rosenblum offers a helpful analytical framework for 
categorizing and distinguishing between these different types of 
extremism.229 Rosenblum distinguishes between two analytical 
accounts of extremism within the American political landscape: 
spatial extremism and typological extremism.230 
 
 225. Id. at *4 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 226. Id. at *6. 
 227. Id. at *6. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See generally Rosenblum, supra note 39, at 849–56. 
 230. Id. at 851–52. 
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In Rosenblum’s terms, “spatial extremism” refers to a “relative 
political positioning.”231 Typically, this political topography implies 
the existence of a center that is dominant and extremes that are 
weaker and numerically few.232 Because of its relative nature, the 
spatial model is not static. The center may move, and accordingly the 
spatial extremist may also shift and change her position.233 On the 
other hand, according to Rosenblum, “typological extremism” is not 
based on the degree of divergence from the center, but rather on a 
“wholesale reaction and rejection” of the “consensus values and 
practices” of American political thought.234 Since, according to 
Rosenblum, the central consensus of American politics can be 
defined broadly as “liberalism,” extremism in a typological sense can 
be described as “antiliberalism.” Accordingly, an “antiliberal” view is 
characterized by a rejection of core liberal values such as “personal 
security, impartiality, individual liberty, and democracy” and 
opposition to liberal practices such as “religious toleration, freedom 
of discussion, . . . free elections, . . . and more.”235 Among the 
groups or parties that answer to this “antiliberal” typological 
definition, Rosenblum identifies the Ku Klux Klan, various neo-Nazi 
parties, the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), and 
various separatist and rejectionist groups operating in the United 
States.236 
Perhaps it is not surprising that, like the ballot access laws 
adopted in the 1930s and 1940s, the viewpoint-based exclusion 
decisions focus upon typologically extreme candidates rather than 
upon spatially extreme candidates. First, it is likely that typologically 
extreme candidates can cause severe damage to the major party 
regardless of their success. Their mere participation in the primaries 
or in the national convention will inevitably draw media attention 
and will harm the electorate’s image of the party. Hence, the major 
 
 231. Id. at 849. 
 232. Id. at 850–52. 
 233. Id. at 851. Rosenblum mentions antidiscrimination policy or abortion rights as 
examples of political issues that reveal the moving center in American politics. 
 234. Id. at 852. 
 235. Id. at 853–54. 
 236. Id. at 855. It should be noted that this definition of “typological extremist” parties 
is very similar to the definition offered by the German Constitutional Court when it 
determined which parties are subject to the Constitutional-mandated banning regime. See 
Judith Wise, Comment, Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the 
Banning of the Free German Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 301, 311 (1998). 
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party has a clear incentive to disassociate itself from such extremists 
and actually show its disdain for their views.237 Moreover, it appears 
that, particularly with typological extremists, a decision to exclude a 
candidate would enjoy wide-range support and be considered 
legitimate and justified. Rarely will major parties achieve such a 
broad consensus concerning a decision to exclude factions which are 
not typologically extreme. Lastly, according to a comparative study 
conducted by Pippa Norris focusing on radical right parties, 
typologically extreme voters do not usually vote for more moderate 
right-wing parties even if the typologically extreme party they 
support has no chance of success.238 Accordingly, it appears that as 
opposed to other factions of the electorate, embracing these 
extremists within the major party does not correlate to an electoral 
gain for the major party. Even if such a typological extremist 
participates in the major party’s nomination process (and loses), it is 
likely that her supporters will not vote for the major party in the 
general elections.239 
Admittedly, the hostile attitude of the party establishment 
towards extremist candidates may be applied in certain cases towards 
“maverick” candidates that merely oppose the establishment 
candidate. Such candidates often encounter serious obstacles when 
trying to get on the primary ballot. This was especially apparent in 
recent years with Republican primary candidates Steven Forbes 
(1996 presidential election) and John McCain (2000 presidential 
election).240 Similarly, in a few recent cases, parties excluded certain 
candidates from primary participation on the basis of their alleged 
“disloyalty” to the party.241 However, these cases appear not to 
 
 237. Bennett J. Matelson, Tilting the Electoral Playing Field: The Problem of Subjectivity 
in Presidential Election Law, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238, 1278 (1994) (“Abuses such as this are 
more likely to be directed toward minor candidates like Duke since there is little chance of 
popular outcry if they are improperly excluded.”). 
 238. NORRIS, supra note 48, at 113. 
 239. A possible explanation is that for typological extremists the major parties are just too 
far away ideologically to be considered as a serious alternative. See id. 
 240. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155, 156–57 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 78 
F.3d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1996); Molinari v. Powers, 82 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); 
Persily, supra note 195, at 2199–206. 
 241. See Swanson v. Pitt, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1275–76 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“[A] 
political party also has a First Amendment right to freedom of association. . . . This 
associational right is broad enough to include a party’s decision to exclude people who have not 
been loyal to the party.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Ala. Republican Party v. 
McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 349–50 (Ala. 2004) (“McGinley’s comments plainly and 
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involve an objection to the candidate’s extremist viewpoint but 
rather involve a regular intra-party power play (the first line of cases) 
or an objection to a candidate switching parties to get elected (the 
second line of cases). Thus, although the jurisprudence on this 
matter is still equivocal, it does appear that viewpoint-based 
exclusion is indeed a threat typically facing typological extremist 
candidates.  
D. Conclusion: The American Banning System 
Finally, it is time to take stock of the combined effect of the 
various barriers facing extremists in the American electoral system. 
On the one hand, the electoral system and strict ballot access rules 
severely limit the ability of extremist candidates to run on a separate 
platform as a minor party candidate. Hence, they are channeled to 
run through one of the major parties.242 On the other hand, when a 
typologically extremist candidate such as Duke, LaRouche, or Miller 
seeks election within the major party, she is excluded from the ballot 
or the national convention; when she protests, the party maintains 
that her rights have not been violated because she can always run as a 
minor party candidate. As the court explained in Duke v. Massey, 
“[n]othing precludes these voters from supporting Duke as an 
independent candidate or a third-party candidate in the general 
election.”243 Likewise, in LaRouche v. Fowler, “LaRouche retained 
the right to run, and his supporters the right to vote for him, as 
either a third-party or independent candidate.”244 But indeed, in 
light of the preceding discussion, it is obvious that these extremist 
prescriptions are actually ineffective and illusory. To demonstrate this 
point, when Duke was excluded from the Georgia Republican 
primary in 1992, only four candidates qualified for the Georgia 
 
unambiguously crossed the line between criticism of an individual and criticism of the party as 
a whole. She endorsed the Constitution Party and urged Republicans to exhibit ‘tough love’ 
toward their party.” (emphasis added)); Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 
1037 (Ala. 2004) (disqualifying candidate Dow from participating in the Democratic primary 
for district court judge because she had sought the office of circuit judge as a Republican in 
1998 and 2000); see also Kucinich v. Tex. Democratic Party, 530 F. Supp. 2d 879, 888 (W.D. 
Tex. 2008) (ruling against Democratic Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich and affirming 
the right of the Texas Democratic Party to deny access to the presidential primary ballot to a 
candidate who refuses to pledge to support the party’s nominee in the general election). 
 242. See supra Part VI.A. 
 243. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1233 n.7 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 244. LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 993–94 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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general elections ballot (Bill Clinton, George Bush, the independent 
billionaire candidate Ross Perot, and the Libertarian candidate). 
Similarly, in 2006, when Miller was excluded from the Democratic 
congressional primary, only three candidates made it to the general 
elections ballot (the Republican candidate, the Democratic 
candidate, and the Libertarian candidate). Unsurprisingly, the 
winner of the general election in all instances was one of the major 
party candidates. 
The picture is now clear: as a result of this complex set of 
barriers, a system that claims to be open to all viewpoints effectively 
bars extremists, and particularly typological extremists, from the 
electoral system. Extremists cannot gain representation through a 
minor party and are also subject to the threat of exclusion from the 
major parties. Despite the claim of “American exceptionalism” and 
the emphasis upon the special protection granted to dissenters within 
First Amendment doctrine, the electoral system in practice is closed 
to typological extremists and employs a de facto banning regime to 
drive them out of the electoral system. In light of this new 
perspective, it appears worthwhile to compare the American de facto 
banning regime and de jure banning regimes in other democratic 
countries, like Germany, which explicitly authorize the banning of 
certain extremist parties. It is also worth exploring the possible 
implications this conclusion has upon American electoral law itself. 
However, before examining the implications that arise from the 
preceding analysis, there are two possible reservations worth 
consideration concerning the severity of the American de facto 
banning regime.  
First, it is clear that the limitations placed upon extremists in the 
American system are not absolute. At least in theory, the extremists 
may gain sufficient strength among the electorate, allowing them to 
overcome the barriers that limit participation. Thus, they may 
succeed in being included on the ballot, and perhaps, if they have a 
distinct geographical stronghold, their candidate may even get 
elected in certain districts even under the FPTP system. 
Furthermore, as there is generally no limitation upon becoming a 
party member (and thus vote in a party primary),245 an extremist 
 
 245. The only limitation states may impose upon members concerns the waiting period 
before new party members can vote in a party primary. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 
U.S. 567, 596 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the real world, however, anyone can ‘join’ 
a political party merely by asking for the appropriate ballot at the appropriate time or (at most) 
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group may infiltrate a major party and gain enough strength within 
the party so that it will be hard to ignore. In addition, if the 
extremists are strong enough, they may be considered an “attractive 
electoral prize” so that the major parties will have an incentive not to 
exclude them, or at least they will have to balance their “negative” 
effect with their possible “positive” electoral value. However, these 
reservations do not change the conclusion of this Article’s analysis. 
To begin with, even if extremist parties may overcome the 
mentioned barriers on the condition that they gather enough 
strength and support, it is difficult to ignore the fact that, to a large 
extent, the existing barriers make it much harder for these parties to 
gain this support. In many cases, inclusion on the ballot, getting 
minor representation in parliament, or even participating in the 
primaries or a national convention are a means to gain power, 
legitimacy, status, and resources.246 If an extremist group has to 
evolve into a major political player outside of the electoral arena, it 
will likely fail. And in any case, at least David Duke and his 
supporters were not an insignificant political force. The willingness 
to exclude him from a primary ballot shows that even if an extremist 
gains strength it may not be enough to convince a major party to 
accept her into the party. Furthermore, even in democracies that 
employ a formal banning regime, the extremist minor parties are 
typically banned rather than the major parties. In fact, certain 
scholars refer to this problem as a paradox that undermines the 
legitimacy of a formal party-banning regime altogether.247 Therefore, 
the fact that the limitations imposed by the American system are 
focused on minor parties does not mark a fundamental difference 
compared to formal banning regimes. 
A second criticism relates to the prevalence of the phenomenon 
highlighted here. Indeed, there may be cases apart from David Duke, 
Lyndon LaRouche, or Frazier Miller in which major parties allowed 
typological extremists to present their candidacy or participate in the 
 
by registering within a state-defined reasonable period of time before an election; neither past 
voting history nor the voter’s race, religion, or gender can provide a basis for the party’s refusal 
to ‘associate’ with an unwelcome new member.”). 
 246. NORRIS, supra note 48, at 114. 
 247. According to their argument, there is no point in banning a party when it is weak 
and does not pose a serious threat. On the other hand, it is impossible to ban a party when it is 
a strong player in the electoral arena. See Günter Frankenberg, The Learning Sovereign, in 
MILITANT DEMOCRACY 113, 125 (András Sajó ed., 2004). 
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national convention. One well-known example is the case of Tom 
Metzger, who in 1980 won the Democratic Party’s nomination for 
U.S. House of Representative from the San Diego area although he 
was a Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan.248 Moreover, in the case 
of Duke, many states granted him access to the ballot, yet he failed 
in gaining substantial support.249 Nevertheless, the emergence of the 
option to effectively exclude an extremist candidate from the primary 
ballot and the emergence of a comprehensive barrier, as was 
employed in the case of LaRouche, is significant and worthy of 
analysis. 
Indeed, following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 1998, the 
Democratic Party proceeded to exclude LaRouche again both in 
2000 and 2004, and he did not attempt to challenge these 
exclusions in court. This means that at least LaRouche is operating 
under the assumption that this limitation is absolute and neither a 
unique nor unusual occurrence. The same conclusion could also be 
drawn from the straightforward manner in which the Miller court 
dismissed Miller’s claim concerning his exclusion from the primary 
ballot. Additionally, it is useful to note that even in countries with a 
formal banning regime, like Germany, very few parties are actually 
banned. In many cases, despite its availability, this harsh measure is 
not employed against existing extremist parties.250 Thus, the fact that 
the American de facto banning regime is not absolute and is not 
employed against all extremists does not in itself disprove its 
existence. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding discussion has focused on portraying the 
substantial barriers facing extremists in the American electoral arena. 
This part proceeds to examine the implications of this descriptive 
 
 248. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 217 n.4 
(1989). After Metzger won the Democratic primaries he was disavowed by the Democratic 
Party and lost in a landslide to the Republican candidate in the general election. In 1992 
Metzger ran again unsuccessfully in California’s Democratic primary for U.S. Senate. See Anti-
Defamation League, Extremism in America, Tom Metzger, http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us 
(follow “individuals” hyperlink; then follow “Tom Metzger” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 6, 
2008). 
 249. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 250. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 224 (2d ed. 1997). 
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account. First, if the American de facto banning regime and the 
formal banning regimes of other democracies can be viewed as 
alternative means to combat extremism, it is worthwhile to compare 
these regimes to discover their relative strengths and weaknesses. In 
addition, this Part will examine the conclusions that can be derived 
from this account concerning American electoral law. 
A. Comparison Between the American Banning Regime and Formal 
Banning Regimes 
There are obviously many differences between the American de 
facto banning regime and the formal banning regimes that exist in 
other democracies. This section highlights five major points of 
comparison, focusing particularly upon the formal banning regimes 
in three liberal democracies: Germany, Spain, and Israel. 
The most significant difference between the two systems is also 
the most obvious: in countries that employ a formal banning regime, 
the regime is explicit, its existence is not disputed, and it is usually 
authorized by a specific constitutional provision. Conversely, in the 
United States there is no similar explicit limitation upon the electoral 
arena. The First Amendment is absolute in its formulation, and the 
conventional wisdom is that there are no viewpoint limitations upon 
extremist parties or candidates. Thus, the implicit limitations 
described above are subtle, informal, and in most respects, 
unacknowledged. 
The effects of this major difference are twofold: on the one hand, 
the American system is much less focused on the educational value of 
labeling certain views as illegitimate, but on the other hand, the 
American system prevents open discussion about the merits and 
dangers of limiting extremist participation in the electoral arena. 
First, according to public perception, “no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion.”251 As a result, the “chilling” of extremist 
speech, which may be a negative cost of an explicit banning regime, 
is much less likely to occur in the United States. In the United 
States, at least from an educational perspective, “extremes are not . . 
. understood as the peripheral cost of an inevitably imperfect world, 
in which no one can be trusted to draw the proper lines properly, 
 
 251. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942). 
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but rather as integral to the central functions of the principle of free 
speech.”252 This serves to enhance public discussion and allows even 
extremist speakers to develop their views without constant fear of 
sanction. 
However, it is precisely this aspect of the American political 
landscape that prevents an open and honest discussion on the merits 
and dangers of limiting extremism in the electoral arena.253 By 
avoiding the issue, focusing on the theoretical possibility of an 
extremist party succeeding on its own, and highlighting the formal 
freedom that exists even for extremists, an important debate is 
stifled. As opposed to Germany, for example, which has struggled for 
decades with the issue of limitations upon extremist speech, the 
United States has taken the issue off the table due to complacency 
and unawareness. Yet, this lack of discussion does not cause these 
extremists to disappear. There is always a danger that frustrated 
extremists, who feel shunned from the electoral arena, will decide to 
act illegally and to use violence to make themselves heard. An open 
discussion concerning these limitations would allow us to take into 
account the dangers and the benefits that stem from the current state 
of affairs. It could help us make sure that we are drawing the line in 
the proper place. 
A second point of related comparison is the distinction between 
the limitations placed upon the electoral arena and limitations 
imposed upon free speech in the general “marketplace of ideas.”254 
As explained above,255 in pointing to the existence of a de facto 
banning regime in the electoral arena, this Article does not deny the 
extraordinary freedom granted in the United States to extremist 
speech outside the electoral arena. Thus, while the electoral arena is, 
in practice, quite restrictive towards extremists, the general free 
speech arena operates under the Brandenburg rule, which states that 
any extremist speech is permissible unless it “is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
 
 252. BOLLINGER, supra note 4, at 133. 
 253. See Dan Gordon, Limits on Extremist Political Parties: A Comparison of Israeli 
Jurisprudence with that of the United States and West Germany, 10 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 347, 395 (1987) (concluding that a system that explicitly bans extremist parties is 
“more honest, and therefore perhaps more educational, about why certain parties are blocked 
from entering the legislature”). 
 254. Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 1458. 
 255. See supra Part III. 
BLIGH.FIN 11/24/2008 5:55 PM 
1367] Extremism in the Electoral Arena 
 1419 
such action.”256 In contrast, in Germany, for example, limitations 
upon extremist speech in the electoral arena are also applied in the 
general “marketplace of ideas” context.257 Thus, the German 
Criminal Code prohibits the dissemination of propaganda that 
supports the ideas of unconstitutional parties and also prohibits the 
use of insignias of these same parties.258 
It should be observed, however, that this distinction between 
limitations imposed upon the electoral arena and those imposed 
upon general free speech is not unique to the United States. For 
example, Spain also takes a more restrictive approach to the electoral 
arena than to the general free speech context. According to Article 9 
of Spain’s new Political Parties Law (“Parties Law”),259 the state can 
ban a party if it repeatedly “encourages or legitimizes violence as a 
method to achieve political ends,” even if its speech does not 
constitute direct incitement. In contrast, according to the Spanish 
Criminal Code, the state can only punish mere advocacy of illegal 
activity (including violence) when the speech “directly incites the 
commission of a crime.”260 Similarly, the Parties Law allows the 
government to ban a party for expressing tacit support for terrorism 
on a repeated basis; however, under the criminal code, it is only a 
crime to explicitly praise terrorism.261 
A third distinction between the American de facto banning 
regime and a formal banning regime concerns the identity of the 
discretionary body making the banning decisions. Typically, 
countries that impose a formal banning regime include the general 
authority to ban certain parties in the Constitution, and the highest 
 
 256. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added). 
 257. Similarly, the formula that encompasses the banning of political parties appears in 
similar form in other portions of the Basic Law as well. For instance, Article 9(2) of the Basic 
Law includes a similar provision allowing for the banning of associations opposed to the free 
democratic order; Article 5(2) contains a provision declaring that free speech (and other rights) 
may be limited by “the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection 
of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal honor.” See CURRIE, supra note 10, at 
177–78. 
 258. David A. Jacobs, The Ban of Neo-Nazi Music: Germany Takes on the Neo-Nazis, 34 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 563, 570 (1993). 
 259. Article 9(2)(b) of Ley Organica de Partidos Politicos 154 (B.O.E. 2002), translated 
in Comella, supra note 14, at 143. 
 260. Comella, supra note 14, at 139.  
 261. See id. at 139–40. Comella has strongly criticized the banning statute as overbroad, 
particularly its use of general and open-ended terms that could theoretically apply to a wide 
range of parties. Id. at 141–46. 
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court makes specific banning decisions.262 For example, the German 
Constitution explicitly declares that any decision concerning the 
constitutionality of a political party is solely in the hands of the 
Federal Constitutional Court.263 Similarly, in Spain, Article 10(4) of 
the Parties Law specifically notes that all banning decisions shall be 
made solely by a sala especial (special chamber) of the Supreme 
Court.264 These provisions, and other similar provisions in other 
countries, reflect the sensitivity and democratic severity in which 
other countries approach a party-banning decision. These provisions 
also reflect an understanding that it is much safer to let the courts 
make banning decisions. This is especially true in light of the 
electoral implications of a banning decision and the danger of self-
serving motivations that might affect a political body making a 
banning decision. 
In the American electoral system, while the limitations upon 
minor parties do not explicitly reflect any discretionary action, the 
exclusion of extremist candidates and their representatives from the 
major party’s nomination process is left in the hands of party 
officials. For example, the decision to exclude David Duke from the 
Georgia primary ballot was made by the Georgia Republican Party 
Chairperson, Georgia’s Senate Minority Leader, and Georgia’s 
House Minority Leader. Similarly, in the case of Lyndon LaRouche, 
the Democratic National Committee Chairperson chose to exclude 
the candidate from the ballot. Leaving such a decision in the hands 
of party officials, who are legitimately affected by political 
considerations, is problematic when the actual effect of the decision 
is the total exclusion of typological extremists from the electoral 
arena. This point will be further elaborated below.265 
The fourth distinction266 concerns the ability of large extremist 
parties to succeed in the electoral arena. In the United States there is 
no formal restrictive regime imposed upon extremist parties; 
therefore, if an extremist party gained sufficient strength it could 
 
 262. See Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 1453–57. 
 263. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Article 21(2), translated in KOMMERS, supra 
note 250, at 511 (“The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the question of 
unconstitutionality.”). 
 264. See Leslie Turano, Spain: Banning Political Parties as a Response to Basque Terrorism, 
1 INT. J. CONST. L. 730, 734 (2003). 
 265. See infra text accompanying notes 322–24. 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 245–47. 
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theoretically compete and win despite the structural limitations 
imposed upon minor parties. Additionally, if an extremist faction 
within a major party is powerful enough, it may be too large for the 
party to ignore, and its representatives would probably be included 
in the nomination process. In contrast, in formal banning regimes, 
an extremist party will be banned regardless of its actual support if its 
agenda and actions fall within the definitions of the banning statute. 
While this constitutes a real difference between the two systems; 
it appears to be merely a theoretical difference with no practical 
significance. The ability of an extremist party in the United States to 
gain power outside of the electoral arena is practically non-existent. 
For the last 150 years, no new party has consistently succeeded in 
the American electoral arena, and there is no reason to suspect that 
this will change. Furthermore, it is not clear whether, even in an 
explicit banning regime, major parties will be banned. In fact, it 
appears that the main thrust in explicit banning regimes is towards 
curbing minor parties’ success before they become major parties. It is 
highly doubtful that a democracy can really ban an extremist party if 
this party enjoys the support of a substantial part of the electorate.267  
Finally, a fifth distinction is the identity of the extremist parties 
or candidates that are banned in the two systems. In explicit banning 
regimes this is relatively clear as the nature of the banned parties is 
defined by the banning statute and by later court decisions. For 
instance, in Germany, Article 21(2) of the Basic Law holds that 
“[p]arties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their 
adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic order or to 
endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are 
unconstitutional.”268 Similarly, in Spain, Article 9(2) allows parties to 
be banned when they repeatedly and systematically exhibit behavior 
(a) violating fundamental rights by promoting, justifying, or 
excusing attacks on the life or dignity of the person “or the exclusion 
or persecution of an individual based on his ideology, religion, 
 
 267. An interesting exception can be found in Turkey where the government banned the 
Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), despite the fact that it was the largest party in the 
Turkish parliament. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently approved this ban. 
See Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 1443–46. 
 268. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Article 21(2) (Germany), translated in KOMMERS, 
supra note 250, at 218. 
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[beliefs,] nationality, race, sex, or sexual orientation”;269 (b) 
encouraging or legitimizing violence as a means to achieve political 
ends or as a means to undermine the conditions that make political 
pluralism possible; or (c) assisting and giving political support to 
terrorist organizations with the aim of subverting the constitutional 
order.270 In Israel, Section 7A of the Basic Law, the Knesset 
authorizes the banning of a party that rejects “the existence of the 
State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state,” if its actions or 
platform consist of “incitement to racism,” or if the party supports 
an “armed struggle . . . against the State of Israel.”271 
Conversely, in the United States there is no formal and explicit 
banning regime, and there is also no clear definition of which parties 
or candidates are limited. The structural limitations and state ballot 
access laws impose a universal limiting effect on all parties that do 
not enjoy a certain degree of support. As previously discussed, these 
barriers typically apply to a wide range of parties including parties 
that are merely unpopular regardless of their viewpoint. The 
additional leg of the banning regime—the exclusion from the major 
party’s nomination process—has been directly applied to candidates 
who were perceived as extremists by the leadership of the 
Democratic and Republican parties. In the case of David Duke, his 
writings and his association with the Ku Klux Klan made it relatively 
easier to identify his views as anti-liberal, racist, white separatist, and 
anti-Semite.272 Similarly, Frazier Miller held, by his own admission, 
 
 269. Katherine A. Sawyer, Rejection of Weimarian Politics or Betrayal of Democracy?: 
Spain’s Proscription of Batasuna Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 52 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1531, 1546 n.83 (2003). 
 270. Article 9(2) of the Ley Organica de Partidos Politicos (B.O.E. 2002, 154), translated 
in Turano, supra note 264, at 733; see also Comella, supra note 14, at 142. 
 271. See Basic Law: The Knesset § 7A (Isr.), translated in ISRAEL’S WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 2006). It is worth noting that the Israeli Supreme Court interpreted 
this provision very narrowly, especially the clause dealing with the negation of Israel as a 
“Jewish state.” Thus, despite several petitions concerning parties which allegedly negated the 
“Jewish” nature of the state, no such party has been banned under this clause. In fact, the only 
parties that have been banned under Article 7A have been the racist anti-Arab party (Kach) and 
its offshoots. For the most recent ruling see AB 11280/02 The Central Election Committee 
for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi [2003] IsrSC 57(4) 1, ¶ 6. For previous rulings of the Israeli 
Supreme Court on these matters, see Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Disqualification of Political 
Parties in Israel: 1988–1996, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 67 (1997). 
 272. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Extremism in America, David Duke, 
http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us (follow “individuals” hyperlink; then follow “David Duke” 
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 6, 2008); see also Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1232 n.6 (11th 
Cir. 1996). 
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“pro-White racial viewpoints.”273 These viewpoints made it easier to 
identify him as a white supremacist, and label his views as racist and 
anti-liberal.274 Lyndon LaRouche presents a more problematic 
example as his views are more confused and ambiguous. In fact, 
LaRouche himself denies the DNC’s claims275 that he holds racist 
and anti-Semite views, and there are those who think of him as an 
odd conspiracy-theorist rather than a Fascist or racist.276 In a media 
appearance a few years ago, LaRouche presented a very clear view 
against anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial.277 This ambiguity in 
LaRouche’s views could save him from banning under formal 
banning regimes which typically demand an unequivocal showing as 
to the unconstitutional nature of the banned party (or candidate).278 
Therefore, LaRouche’s exclusion reveals the problematic 
consequences that may arise as a result of the lack of clear standards 
and explicit definitions in the American de facto banning regime.279 
B. Examining the Exclusion of Extremists from Major Parties 
So far the Supreme Court has not ruled on a case that involves 
viewpoint-based exclusion from a party’s nominating process. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the court decisions in Cleland, Massey, 
Fowler, and Miller, which allowed the exclusion of typological 
extremist candidates from major parties’ nomination processes, are in 
 
 273. Miller v. Carnahan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34909, at *5 (W.D. Mo. May 31, 
2006). 
 274. See Press Release from James Goodwin, Green County Missouri Democrats, supra 
note 222. 
 275. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 276. George Johnson, A Menace or Just a Crank?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1989, at A7. 
 277. Lyndon LaRouche, Film Review: Mel Gibson’s “The Passion of the Christ”, NEW 
CITIZEN, April 2004, at 7, available at http://www.cecaust.com.au/pubs/pdfs/passion.pdf. 
 278. For example, the Israeli Supreme Court made it clear that a ban may be justified 
only if the prohibited aims of the party are dominant and central in its agenda, these aims are 
substantial and serious in their magnitude, and the evidence is “convincing, clear and 
unequivocal.” See AB 11280/02 Central Election Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi 
[2003] IsrSC 57(4) 1, ¶ 6. 
 279. It could be argued that this is actually an advantage of the American system. That is, 
it leads to the exclusion of typological extremists even if they try to conceal their views and 
thus would not be banned under a formal banning regime. However, this argument is not 
convincing for two main reasons. First, even in formal banning regimes courts do not have to 
accept the extremists’ statements at face value, and they may inquire as to their real views and 
intentions. Second, the advantage of a formal court analysis is that it prevents mere “witch 
hunts” of candidates, which may be excluded from the party not because of their extremism 
but because of their unpopularity or even quirkiness. 
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line with the recent trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
concerning intra-party disputes. 
In general, party nomination processes involve a complex 
balancing of rights. The complexity arises primarily from the 
“hybrid” nature of major parties.280 On one hand, a political party is 
a form of private association that is formed to advance the First 
Amendment right of association of its members and to win 
governmental office. Like other voluntary organizations, the political 
party has a right and reasonable expectation to control its 
membership and leadership selection process. On the other hand, as 
opposed to other voluntary organizations, major parties are both 
heavily regulated by state laws and enjoy significant state-conferred 
benefits. For instance, state laws specify the criteria for party 
membership, determine the primary election procedures, and grant a 
preferred status on the ballot to the major parties.281 Furthermore, 
within the FPTP system the major parties enjoy de facto control of 
the electoral arena, and other parties have virtually no chance to 
compete. In these respects, the parties operate in a very different 
setting than other private associations that generally operate freely 
alongside each other in civil society. 
Moreover, as is clear from Duke and LaRouche, party nomination 
conflicts uniquely involve situations in which the “First Amendment 
weighs on both sides of the balance.”282 While general ballot access 
questions typically weigh the First Amendment rights of the voters 
against the interests of the state in regulation of the ballot, primary 
nomination disputes involve the balancing of the First Amendment 
right of participation or representation of party members and 
candidates against the First Amendment right of association of the 
party itself—its right to define itself, protect its autonomy, and 
determine its own path.283 
 
 280. For a general discussion of the matter see, for example, Nathaniel Persily, Toward a 
Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 754–66 (2001). 
 281. Id.; see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118–21 (2d ed. 
1988). 
 282. LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 283. For a detailed account of these complexities see, for example, Hasen, supra, note 
123, at 826–27 (recognizing that “party organizations should have First Amendment rights of 
speech and association when they are conducting their own internal affairs.”); Persily, supra 
note 195; David Schleicher, “Politics As Markets” Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, 
Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American Elections, 14 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 163, 164–68 (2006). 
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In the past, courts have resolved this tension by ruling against 
the major parties. Particularly in the White Primary Cases,284 the 
Supreme Court emphasized that certain party actions, such as 
running a primary election, should be considered state action if they 
are an integral part of the electoral machinery. Therefore, these 
actions are subject to the Equal Protection Clause and to the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Accordingly, political parties could not 
exclude African-Americans from participation in primaries. These 
cases were unique, however, in two main respects. First, and most 
importantly, the White Primary Cases involved blatant racial 
discrimination rather than mere intra-party feud or a “normal” case 
of viewpoint discrimination. Second, these cases concerned states 
that the Democratic Party effectively controlled; hence, the 
Democratic primary winner was also the winner in general 
elections.285 
In recent years, the pendulum has swung the other way. The 
Court has placed more emphasis on the rights of the parties 
themselves, particularly the party’s right to control its ideological 
message and nomination process without state intrusion.286 This 
approach was most prominently manifested in three Supreme Court 
decisions: Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,287 California 
Democratic Party v. Jones,288 and Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Committee.289  
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,290 the Court 
ruled in favor of the Republican Party and struck down a 
 
 284. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). For a 
detailed discussion of these cases, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD 
H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 103–
17 (2d ed. 2002). 
 285. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 40, at 652–60. 
 286. See Benjamin D. Black, Developments in the State Regulation of Major and Minor 
Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 111 (1996); Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and 
Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 180–81 (2005); Schleicher, supra note 
283, at 205–06. For various justifications for this approach, see Bruce E. Cain, Party Autonomy 
and Two-Party Electoral Competition, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806–10 (2001). For criticism 
of the jurisprudential tendency to protect party autonomy, see Hasen, supra note 123, at 826–
37. 
 287. 479 U.S. 208, 213–17 (1986).  
 288. 530 U.S. 567, 581–82 (2000). 
 289. 489 U.S. 214, 223–25 (1989). 
 290. 479 U.S. 208, 229 (1986). 
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Connecticut law that mandated a closed primary. The Court made it 
clear that the party had a right to define who may vote in its 
primaries. The Court also held that a statute forcing a party to close 
its primary “limits the Party’s associational opportunities at the 
crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be 
translated into concerted action.”291  
More recently, in California Democratic Party v. Jones,292 the 
situation was reversed, but the Court’s position was the same. Jones 
involved a “blanket primary” law that California voters adopted as a 
ballot initiative. It would have allowed any voter, regardless of party 
affiliation, to vote in any party’s primary. The parties objected to 
opening their primaries and the Court invalidated the law. The 
Court held that 
[i]n no area is the political association’s right to exclude more 
important than in the process of selecting its nominee. That process 
often determines the party’s positions on the most significant 
public policy issues of the day, and even when those positions are 
predetermined it is the nominee who becomes the party’s 
ambassador to the general electorate in winning it over to the 
party’s views.293 
These Supreme Court decisions lend support to the holdings in 
Massey, Fowler, and Miller. In fact, it may appear that the Court’s 
explicit statement in Jones, concerning the “right to exclude,” settles 
these cases. But the picture is more complex, as Jones did not involve 
a party’s decision to exclude certain candidates or even party 
members. Instead, Jones involved the exclusion of independents and 
members of other parties from a party’s primary process. Thus, Jones 
presented an easier case for the Court because it suggested an easy 
alternative for those excluded. As Justice Scalia explained, “[t]he 
voter who feels himself disenfranchised should simply join the 
party.”294 Regardless of this alternative’s sufficiency, it is clear that it 
 
 291. Id. at 216. 
 292. 530 U.S. 567, 569–70, 586 (2000). 
 293. Id. at 575 (emphasis added). The Court reached a different result in Clingman v. 
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005); however, as various commentators have noted, it seems that the 
result in that case was affected by the fact the “party autonomy” claim was made by a minor 
party (Libertarian Party) and involved issues that do not confront major parties. For further 
analysis see Evseev, supra note 70, at 1300–02; Allison, supra note 105, at 337–40. 
 294. Jones, 530 U.S. at 584. For criticism of this view see Magarian, supra note 39, at 
2015–16. 
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was not available to Duke, LaRouche, or Miller because they had 
already chosen to join a major party and participate in its nominating 
process. 
The Court’s decision in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic 
Committee appears more relevant to cases of viewpoint exclusion 
from major parties.295 In Eu the Court invalidated a California law 
that prohibited official governing bodies of political parties from 
endorsing or opposing candidates in primary elections. The Court 
held the law to be unconstitutional because “[b]arring political 
parties from endorsing and opposing candidates not only burdens 
their freedom of speech but also infringes upon their freedom of 
association,” and the state failed to present a compelling interest 
justifying such infringement.296 The Eu decision is particularly 
relevant to the issue at hand because it dealt specifically with the 
party’s right to influence the nomination process on the candidate 
level rather than on the membership or electorate level. 
Furthermore, while Tashjian and Jones concerned general policy 
decisions that merely had an indirect effect on the ideological 
cohesiveness of the party, the Eu decision directly dealt with 
questions of ideology. The Court in Eu emphasized the importance 
of allowing party governing bodies to state “whether a candidate 
adheres to the tenets of the party or whether party officials believe 
that the candidate is qualified for the position sought.”297 The Court 
also explained that freedom of association means that “a political 
party has a right to ‘identify the people who constitute the 
association’”298 and “to select a ‘standard bearer who best represents 
the party’s ideologies and preferences.’”299 In fact, the Court 
specifically mentioned that it was important to offer the party a 
chance to oppose certain candidates in order to prevent “a candidate 
with views antithetical to those of her party . . . to win its 
primary.”300 Notably, the Court mentioned in this context the 
example of Tom Metzger, who in 1980 won the Democratic Party’s 
 
 295. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
 296. Id. at 224. 
 297. Id. at 223. 
 298. Id. at 224 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 
(1986)). 
 299. Id. (Tamm, J., concurring) (quoting Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 
525 F.2d 567, 601 (1975)). 
 300. Id. at 217. 
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nomination for U.S. House of Representatives from the San Diego 
area even though he was a Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan “and 
held views antithetical to those of the Democratic Party.”301 Thus, 
Eu appears to offer significant support to the position of the courts 
in the Duke-LaRouche-Miller cases. 
Further support for this position can be found in the recent case 
of New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres,302 which 
involved a challenge to a state law requiring that parties elect their 
nominees for state judgeships by a convention composed of 
delegates elected by party members. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
convention system violated the First Amendment rights of 
challengers running against candidates favored by the party 
establishment. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and offered a 
narrow interpretation of the rights of party members within the party 
nomination process. The Court held that as long as the party 
members were not excluded from voting in the delegate primary, 
there was no constitutional difficulty with the fact that the party 
leadership effectively determines the nominees.303 The decision 
underscored the Court’s tendency to grant party leadership wide 
latitude in determining the method for selecting the party candidates 
and its reluctance to support claims of insurgents (like Duke, 
LaRouche, or Miller). 
Finally, it seems that cases like LaRouche’s—involving exclusion 
from the national convention (rather than the primary ballot)—gain 
additional support from cases in which the Court granted special 
protection to major party decisions in the context of a national 
convention. The conflict typically arises in these circumstances when 
a state law, or the specific primary regulations adopted by the state 
party, conflict with the rules of the national party. As a result, the 
national party refuses to recognize the delegates or primary process 
conducted in a specific state.304 In two leading precedents on the 
 
 301. Id. at 217 n.4. 
 302. 128 S. Ct. 791, 798–800 (2008). 
 303. Id. at 798–99. 
 304. A recent example of this kind of conflict can be found in the recent 2008 
Presidential campaign with the decision of the DNC to strip delegates from any state party that 
would unilaterally set its primaries before February fifth. As a result, Florida and Michigan who 
ignored the DNC’s decision were initially expected to lose their representation at the national 
convention, though ultimately, as a result of a compromise, this decision was not implemented. 
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matter, Cousins v. Wigoda305 and Democratic Party of the United 
States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,306 the Court sided with the 
national parties and held that the national parties’ decisions are 
entitled to special protection “in the context of the selection of 
delegates to the National Party Convention.”307 This approach may 
also extend to cases involving ideological exclusion from the national 
convention—like the case of LaRouche—even though the nature of 
the dispute and the identity of the disputing parties are obviously 
different.308 
Despite these strong indications supporting the right of parties 
to exclude extremists, there are strong arguments for a different 
conclusion. Some of these arguments are directly related to the de 
facto banning regime underlined in this Article. 
The major difference between the exclusion cases and the 
aforementioned “party autonomy” cases is that exclusion cases do 
not merely involve the party’s right to endorse or oppose a particular 
candidate, or the party’s right to choose a nomination process that 
makes it harder for insurgent candidates to win. Instead, they involve 
the right to categorically exclude a candidate from the primary ballot 
or the national convention. Such exclusion means that the candidate 
and her supporters are completely banned from the party’s electoral 
competition and cannot even have a say in the formulation of the 
party’s agenda. In that respect, the effect of these cases is more far-
reaching than what the Court allowed in Eu or Jones. Indeed, as the 
dissenting judge in Duke v. Cleland309 opined, the Court’s decision 
in Eu could actually be interpreted as going against the exclusion of 
Duke. The dissenting judge believed that the Court’s decision in Eu 
“identifies party campaigning as the means by which a party asserts 
its First Amendment associational right to select its standard bearer,” 
and “thus recognized by implication that candidates deemed by the 
Party leadership to be inappropriate standard bearers should be 
 
 305. 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975). 
 306. 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981). 
 307. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491. 
 308. See Persily, supra note 195, at 2217–18 (“Courts have rightly recognized the 
national party’s plenary authority to decide the qualifications of delegates and whether to seat 
them. . . . The party convention represents the purest expression of the ‘party as 
organization.’”). 
 309. 954 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (commenting on 
the first proceeding involving Duke’s exclusion from the Georgia ballot (preliminary 
injunction)). 
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permitted to participate, even if unsuccessfully, in the primary 
process itself.”310 
Furthermore, as the dissenting judge pointed out, even if the 
party leadership has the prerogative to determine the course of the 
party, or to express its endorsement or objection to certain 
candidates, it ultimately cannot perpetuate its power by preventing a 
free electoral battle between the various factions of the party 
members.311 In that respect these cases reveal the complexity in 
identifying who exactly is “the party.” Is a party comprised of the 
primary voters themselves (the party in-the-electorate), or rather the 
party organization and leadership?312 If we allow the party leadership 
to determine who can participate in the nominating process, we are 
accepting a certain level of paternalism: the leadership decides on 
behalf of the members which candidates are “best for the party” 
rather than allowing the members to make this determination 
through their voting.313 Although the Court emphasized in Lopez 
Torres that the party is allowed to select candidates through a 
convention,314 once it chose an open and democratic nomination 
process, it is much more problematic to interfere with the fairness 
 
 310. Id. 
 311. In certain respects, this situation could be compared to a tender offer in the 
corporate setting. In such circumstances, the board may express its view regarding a tender 
offer, but ultimately the shareholders have to decide whether they will accept the offer. 
 312. The familiar classification scheme addressing this question was suggested by V.O. 
Key which separated the party into three groups, or levels: (1) the party-in-the-electorate, 
comprised of ordinary party members, (2) the party-in-government, which consists of all 
elected and appointed officials affiliated with the party, and (3) the party organization, which 
includes all those who serve on party committees or perform other organizational tasks 
intended to enhance the party’s electoral success. See V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES & 
PRESSURE GROUPS 163–65 (5th ed. 1964). 
 313. Persily, supra note 195, at 2186 (“Of course, the paternalism inherent in this 
position is obvious: The party organization is trying to protect the party-in-the-electorate from 
itself.”). Interestingly, the court in Massey did not ignore this problematic aspect of the 
decision as it found it necessary to explain that the leadership’s decision is, in effect, authorized 
by the members because “[a]lthough the Committee’s decision to exclude a candidate from 
the presidential primary ballot is unreviewable by the entire membership of the party, these 
committee members are leaders in the Republican Party and are ultimately held accountable 
for their decisions by the membership of the Republican Party.” Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 
1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1996). However, it is not clear whether this logical structure can hold, 
and whether the general accountability of the party leadership would be deemed sufficient to 
support an exclusion which could affect the election of the leadership itself. 
 314. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 799 (2008). 
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and equality of opportunity that is inherent in such a process.315 
Thus, “[i]f the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing 
power of the democratic process, it must accord the participants in 
that process . . . the First Amendment rights that attach to their 
roles.”316 
Moreover, the de facto banning regime described in this Article 
also has direct implications on the resolution of these cases. As 
Justice O’Connor explained in her concurring opinion in Clingman 
v. Beaver,317 when courts assess regulatory burdens on associational 
rights, they should engage in a “realistic assessment” and an 
“examination of the cumulative effects of the State’s overall 
scheme.”318 Justice Kennedy also endorsed this approach in his 
concurring opinion in Lopez Torres.319 Indeed, one of the central 
components of the court’s analysis in Duke and LaRouche (also 
mentioned in Miller) was the fact that both candidates had the 
option of running as an independent or third-party candidate.320 In 
 
 315. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787–88 (2002); see also 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres: Is the Right to Vote a 
Constitutional Constraint on Partisan Nominating Conventions?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 399, 403–
04 (2007) (suggesting a model he refers to as “An Election Is An Election,” which is based on 
the principle that “the right to vote bears on candidate nomination proceedings at electoral 
junctures in the nomination process, but not otherwise”). 
 316. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 317. 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 318. Id. at 599. 
 319. 128 S. Ct. at 802 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were the state-mandated-and-
designed nominating convention the sole means to attain access to the general election ballot 
there would be considerable force, in my view, to respondents’ contention that the First 
Amendment prohibits the State from requiring a delegate selection mechanism with the 
rigidities and difficulties attendant upon this one . . . . [T]here is a dynamic relationship 
between, in this case, the convention system and the petition process; higher burdens at one 
stage are mitigated by lower burdens at the other.”). This approach was also advocated by 
Nathaniel Persily who explained that “[t]o find unconstitutional infringements on the right to 
vote and implicitly on the right to run for office, courts must take a holistic approach to the 
interaction of the primary and general election ballots.” Persily, supra note 195, at 2214 
(emphasis added). It should be noted that Persily suggests distinguishing between “Duke” 
cases and “LaRouche” cases. In regard to the Duke line of cases (exclusion from the primary 
ballot), Persily believes that excluding candidates is constitutional if the criteria are established 
in advance and the primary is not the only effective means of gaining representation. Id. at 
2212–13. As to the LaRouche case, Persily believes that the court got it right, because he 
supports granting wide discretion to the National Party in the context of a national 
convention. Id. at 2219–21. 
 320. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1233 n.7 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Nothing precludes 
these voters from supporting Duke as an independent candidate or a third-party candidate in 
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both cases, this assumption was crucial to the “burden” analysis 
because it allowed the courts to conclude (in both cases) that the 
candidates (and their supporters) were not “heavily burdened” when 
their respective parties chose to exclude them from the party. This 
analysis, however, does not properly account for the characteristics of 
the American electoral system and the significant hurdles that face 
extremist parties within the electoral arena. Under these 
circumstances the only effective form of participation for extremist 
candidates and their supporters is within the ambit of a major 
party.321 Hence, if the major party excludes the candidate (and her 
supporters) from its nominating process, the candidate is banned 
altogether from the electoral arena. This is definitely not a light 
burden, but rather quite a heavy one. 
An additional burden upon the excluded candidate is the 
symbolic effect of an exclusion decision. In light of the central role of 
the two major parties in the American system and the general 
understanding of their diffuse and catch-all nature, it is clear that a 
viewpoint-based exclusion by a major party may be perceived as 
similar to the decision of a state authority. Thus, it will probably 
label the typological extremist candidate excluded (and her 
supporters) as “beyond the pale,” or an illegitimate candidate that 
does not even have a place within the “big tent” offered by the 
major party. This obviously burdens the extremist candidate, her 
supporters, and the viewpoints she represents. 
A final problematic aspect of the exclusion decisions is the 
“unfettered discretion” that is left in the hands of party leaders. Such 
wide discretion is open to considerable risks of partisan manipulation 
and unregulated decision-making, regardless of its ideological 
implications.322 When typological extremists are involved, this 
 
the general election.”); LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 993–94 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“LaRouche retained the right to run, and his supporters the right to vote for him, as either a 
third-party or independent candidate.”). 
 321. It is worth noting in this respect, that according to Court doctrine, even when the 
restrictions are content-neutral and regulate merely “time, place, and manner” they receive 
lenient scrutiny only if they leave open adequate alternative channels of communication. See, e.g., 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 322. Persily, supra note 195, at 2212 (“Granting to party leaders or the state the power 
to erect ad hoc primary ballot access rules at any point during the campaign effectively 
translates into an absolute right to exclude candidates based on the whim of party leaders.”); 
see also Matelson, supra note 237, at 1276–79. But see Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. 
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669–71, 682–83 (1998) (allowing precisely this kind of open-ended 
discretion in excluding candidates from televised debates).  
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problem is even more acute because the result of exclusion from a 
major party is an effective ban from the electoral arena. Therefore, an 
exclusion decision puts enormous responsibility in the hands of mere 
party officials. In comparison, in countries that impose a formal 
banning regime, the decision to exclude is typically granted to the 
highest court, such as the Constitutional Court323 or Supreme 
Court.324 Although the situation is quite different in the American 
system, as the decision is made by the party rather than the state, this 
comparative perspective does serve to highlight the gravity of the 
decision and the high level of scrutiny that is required.  
In sum, in deciding cases involving viewpoint-based exclusion, 
the Court should acknowledge the de facto banning regime that is 
created by the combination of the structural features of the FPTP 
system, state laws, and the party’s exclusion decisions. The existence 
of such a regime does not necessarily lead to a categorical rejection 
of all ideological exclusions by a major party because, as the courts 
have clarified, “the First Amendment weighs on both sides of the 
balance.”325 However, this analysis should affect the Court’s 
assessment of the burden imposed on the excluded candidate (and 
her supporters). The “heavy burden” imposed upon the extremist 
candidates should trigger a higher degree of scrutiny and a 
requirement of “narrowly drawn” regulations by the party.326 One 
possible implication of such a heightened level of scrutiny could be 
to require the party to explain why merely endorsing certain 
candidates and disavowing others is not the “least restrictive means” 
of furthering the party’s goal of “defining itself.”327 A possible 
alternative, along the lines suggested by Nathaniel Persily, would 
 
 323. For example, that is the case in Germany. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 
21(2) translated in KOMMERS, supra note 250, at 511 (“The Federal Constitutional Court 
shall decide on the question of unconstitutionality.”). 
 324. For a discussion of Spain, see Comella, supra note 14, at 149 (explaining that the 
banning of parties is decided by a Special Chamber (Sala Especial) of the Supreme Court). 
 325. LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Issacharoff, supra 
note 17, at 1460–62.  
 326. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“[T]he rigorousness of our 
inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a 
challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have 
recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be 
‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’” (quoting Norman v. 
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992))). 
 327. See supra text accompanying notes 309–11 (dissenting judge in Duke v. Cleland). 
BLIGH.FIN 11/24/2008 5:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1434 
allow the party to exclude a candidate only if it specifies, in advance, 
narrowly drawn criteria for exclusion which are not oriented toward 
a specific candidate.328 Whatever specific solution is adopted, it has to 
take into account the nature of the characteristics of the American 
electoral system and the considerable barriers facing extremists 
within the system. 
C. Ballot Access Laws Targeting Minor Parties 
As described above, some of the major barriers limiting the 
success of extremist parties are state laws that impose stringent ballot 
access requirements and anti-fusion laws.329 This Article does not 
intend to add to the voluminous literature generally discussing the 
adequacy and justifications for the ballot access requirements the 
various states impose.330 However, it is worthwhile to devote some 
attention to the intentional nature of some of the ballot access laws 
described in this Article. As the historical accounts presented earlier 
illustrate, ballot access requirements were not merely neutral 
instruments that had an incidental effect of curbing extremism, but 
rather, in many cases, an intentional instrument in the battle against 
typologically extreme parties, especially the Communist Party.331 
This historical record should serve as a warning and lead courts to 
carefully examine new ballot access regulations in order to discover 
the real intentions underlying such legislation rather than accepting 
at face value the purposes mentioned by the legislatures themselves. 
As this section explains, according to Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
regulations that are purposefully aimed at specific parties and 
candidates should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
It is unsettled whether legislators’ illicit motives are relevant to 
First Amendment analysis. Although the leading case of United 
States v. O’Brien332 appeared to be determinative in holding “that 
 
 328. Persily, supra note 195, at 2212–13. 
 329. See supra Part IV.B. 
 330. See, e.g., RASKIN, supra note 113, at 99–116; Black, supra note 286, at 112–60; 
Hall, supra note 82, at 409–24; Winger, supra note 72. 
 331. See supra Part V.A. 
 332. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a familiar principle of 
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on 
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”); see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 
277, 292 (2000) (holding that the Court will not strike down a facially neutral statute simply 
because of an alleged illicit motive). 
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this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on 
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive,” there are several 
recent authorities ruling otherwise. In Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism,333 the Court emphasized that “[t]he principal inquiry in 
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys.” Similarly, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court 
explained that “[i]n determining whether a regulation is content 
based or content neutral, we look to the purpose behind the 
regulation.”334 Some commentators have also noted that regardless 
of the way the judicial tests are conceived, the ultimate goal of First 
Amendment analysis is to flush out regulations that are based on 
illicit motivations.335 
In the ballot access context, the focus upon improper purpose 
seems to be even more central to the constitutional analysis. 
Although the Court has not reached a final conclusion on these 
matters, commentators have noted that the Court may be willing to 
invalidate regulations whose sole (or predominant) purpose is self-
entrenchment.336 The main reason for this approach is that in the 
 
 333. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 334. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985) (explaining that the state may not enact 
regulations that are “in fact based on the desire to suppress a particular point of view”). On the 
murky state of the law regarding this matter, see John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 1103, 1130–33 (2005) (“The Supreme Court has given conflicting guidance on the 
relevance of legislative motive in measuring content discrimination.”). For the problems 
inherent in a purpose analysis, see Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment 
Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 78–
79 (2003). 
 335. Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the 
Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1281 (2005) (“[M]uch First Amendment doctrine could be 
explained as an effort to invalidate laws and official actions that betrayed a high risk of having 
been motivated by the desire to punish unpopular points of view, to control or manipulate 
public debate, or to shield incumbent officeholders from criticism or challenge.”); Elena 
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 441–42 (1996) (explaining that much of First Amendment 
doctrine is aimed at identifying hostility to a speaker’s viewpoint beneath the neutral façade of 
the statute: “hostility [to a speaker’s viewpoint], sympathy [for the majority viewpoint], or self-
interest [of government actors]”). 
 336. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 
GEO. L.J. 491, 522 (1997) (“The Supreme Court on several occasions has explicitly 
acknowledged that ballot access restrictions warrant close judicial scrutiny because of the 
potential they create for incumbent self-dealing.”); Pildes, supra note 44, at 76–78 (“The 
intriguing general issue such examples raise is whether laws whose sole or predominant 
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context of ballot access regulation there is a particularly strong 
incentive for the two major parties controlling the legislature to 
insulate themselves from electoral threats by adopting neutrally 
worded legislation that is justified as serving “stability” or preventing 
“voter confusion.”337 Although the Timmons decision may constitute 
a step away from this direction,338 it still appears to enjoy support 
among electoral law commentators and may not have disappeared 
from Court doctrine.339 In any case, even if there are doubts about 
whether a generalized self-entrenchment purpose alone is sufficient 
for a declaration of unconstitutionality, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the willingness of the Court to apply strict scrutiny 
would and should be even stronger when the motivation for the 
electoral law is hostility toward a specific candidate or party. 
Indeed, in Court decisions considering the constitutionality of 
various electoral laws, the Court has emphasized the alleged neutral 
and nondiscriminatory basis for these laws. In a decision upholding a 
Hawaii ban on write-in candidates, the Court explained that “we 
have repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regulations that 
have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the polls.”340 
Similarly, in Timmons, the Court made it clear that a state’s 
“‘important regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to justify 
‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”341 Since the Court also 
held in Timmons that it is constitutional to pass “electoral 
regulations that may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party 
system,”342 it seems likely that the Court interprets “neutrality” to 
actually mean: no viewpoint discriminatory purpose. In other words, 
states may adopt laws that make it harder for minor parties in general 
 
purpose is political self-entrenchment, of incumbents or parties, should be unconstitutional in 
principle. That issue, not yet fully developed, lies beneath the surface of many constitutional 
conflicts in this field.”). 
 337. See supra text accompanying note 95 and notes 121–123.  
 338. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998) (“Indeed, the Court’s decisions on issues such as partisan 
gerrymandering, ballot access, term limits for congressional candidates, and campaign finance 
manifest the Court’s weakening commitment to an antientrenchment principle.”). 
 339. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 336, at 551–53; Pildes, supra note 44, at 76. But see 
Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 894–95 (2006). 
 340. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992). 
 341. Timmons v. Twin Cities, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (quoting Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). 
 342. Id. at 367. 
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to succeed, but they may not target specific parties or viewpoints. 
Consequently, it appears that when an electoral regulation is aimed 
at a particular party or viewpoint, it will not be upheld.343 
The interpretation suggested here appears to gain particular 
support from two relatively recent Court decisions that highlighted 
the significance of viewpoint-discriminatory purposes in the context 
of facially neutral regulations. In Jones, the decision concerning the 
California blanket primary, the Court noted that the statute at issue 
was intentionally aimed at promoting “centrist” candidates. The 
Court held that such a purpose “is hardly a compelling state interest, 
if indeed it is even a legitimate one.”344 Although the Jones case 
involved a primary law that allegedly interfered with the ideological 
freedom of the parties, rather than the electoral arena as a whole, it 
does seem to reflect the same general sentiment. Indeed, the case 
implies that electoral regulations may indirectly affect the ideological 
nature of the electoral arena, as most electoral regulations necessarily 
do,345 but they cannot purposefully aim to shape the ideological map 
of the electoral arena or intentionally target specific viewpoints. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission v. Forbes.346 The Forbes case involved the 
exclusion of Ralph Forbes—an independent candidate for 
Congress—from a televised debate. Forbes claimed that his First 
Amendment rights were violated, but the Court rejected his claim 
and held that since Forbes “had generated no appreciable public 
interest . . . . [h]is own objective lack of support, not his platform, 
was the criterion [for exclusion].”347 According to the Court in 
Forbes, an exclusion that is based upon the unpopularity or lack of 
“viability” of a candidate is constitutional and is not considered 
viewpoint discriminatory, even though, as various commentators 
have noted, it has a clear viewpoint discriminatory effect.348 
 
 343. This statement could also be interpreted as referring to a requirement for mere 
facial neutrality, but I do not think that this narrow reading is required, especially in light of 
the other cases mentioned below. 
 344. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000) (“[A]ssuring a range of 
candidates who are all more ‘centrist’ . . . is hardly a compelling state interest, if indeed it is 
even a legitimate one.”) (emphasis added); see Pildes, supra note 44, at 108–09. 
 345. Pildes, supra note 44, at 110–11. 
 346. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 347. Id. at 682–83. 
 348. Lack of popularity or viability can serve as quite an accurate proxy for extremists and 
non-mainstream viewpoints. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem 
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However, as the Court emphasized, a viewpoint-discriminatory 
intent is not allowed: “The government can restrict access to a 
nonpublic forum ‘as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] 
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose 
the speaker’s view.’”349 
Admittedly, when dealing with a facially neutral electoral 
regulation, it may be quite difficult to identify a regulation that is 
aimed at a particular candidate or party,350 but it is not impossible. A 
regulation’s legislative history and timing may be most helpful in 
“smoking out” regulations aimed at a particular party or 
candidate.351 For example, many of the ballot access regulations 
aimed at the Communist Party could be identified as such because 
they were adopted following a major surge in the success of the party 
in a previous electoral cycle.352 It should be further noted that there 
may be a theoretical distinction between specific regulations aimed at 
a party or candidate because of a particular viewpoint, and regulation 
aimed at a party merely because it poses an electoral threat. It 
appears, however, that this distinction is insignificant and the two 
categories seem to collapse into one another. When legislators adopt 
a stringent ballot access measure to stop a particular candidate or 
 
of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 
57 (2000) (“The Court’s conclusion that the government’s decision was viewpoint neutral was 
essential to the result. But what causes a candidate to be from a minor, rather than a major, 
party? The answer, of course, is that a minor party candidate’s views are favored by a much 
smaller percentage of the population than those of a major party candidate. From this 
perspective, choosing whom to include in a debate based on whether they are from a minor or 
a major party is all about viewpoint.”); see also Schauer & Pildes, supra note 11, at 1804 n.5. 
 349. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677–78 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
 350. See Hasen, supra note 339, at 858–70. 
 351. See Klarman, supra note 336, at 535–36 (“First, the timing of a particular 
restriction’s enactment may assist in gauging the legislature’s dominant motivation. The 
onerous restriction invalidated in Williams v. Rhodes, for example, was erected by the Ohio 
legislature suspiciously soon after Henry Wallace’s third party candidacy in 1948 had captured 
one percent of that state’s presidential vote (far more than President Truman’s margin of 
victory in the state). Second, the relative stringency of the ballot access requirement should 
speak volumes as to the legislature’s motivation. Hefty past performance and petition signature 
requirements—such as the condition in Williams that a third party have won ten percent of the 
vote at the last presidential election to gain ballot access—are difficult to understand in any 
terms other than entrenchment.”) 
 352. See supra Part V. 
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party, it does not seem to matter whether they oppose her views or 
are concerned about the electoral threat she poses.353 
In sum, according to existing doctrine (properly construed), 
when ballot access regulations are intentionally aimed at a certain 
candidate or party, they should be subject to strict scrutiny even if 
they are facially neutral. Specifically, the courts should carefully 
scrutinize the new regulations to make sure they are not used to 
target specific viewpoints or parties in an effort to banish them from 
the electoral arena. To be sure, this Article does not claim that the 
regulations aimed at the Communist Party should be invalidated 
today, sixty or seventy years after they have been enacted. The 
specific ballot access regulations targeting the Communist Party have 
been typically modified and amended several times since the 1930s 
and 1940s and have not maintained their original form.354 But, in 
light of historical experience, courts should be particularly careful 
when examining new electoral regulations. Attempts to use ballot 
access laws to block specific parties did not end with the 
Communists and still exist today.355 In such cases, if the apparent 
purpose of the law is to block a certain candidate or party, the courts 
should subject the regulation to strict scrutiny, mainly “to determine 
whether there is a sufficiently close fit between the law and the 
asserted compelling interest it serves; if not, then it is a fair inference 
that the law’s principal purpose is the illegitimate one of frustrating 
the exercise of a right.”356 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Democracies have debated for decades what level of tolerance 
should be exhibited toward the intolerant. It has commonly been 
 
 353. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 189, 250–51 (1983). 
 354. It should be noted that in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1985), the 
Court struck down a voting restriction that was eighty years old on a showing that its purpose 
and impact was to burden minorities. However, in that case, it was noted that the 
discriminatory impact continues to this day. This is probably not the case with the regulations 
that were adopted against the Communist Party. 
 355. See Winger, supra note 83, at 247.  According to Winger, in North Carolina, after 
the Socialist Workers Party qualified for the ballot in 1980, the legislature more than 
quadrupled the number of required petition signatures. Similarly, Alabama tripled signature 
requirements in 1995 following the Patriot Party’s nomination of a candidate who had lost in 
the Democratic primary.  Id. 
 356. Dorf, supra note 116, at 1235. 
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assumed that the United States differs fundamentally from other 
liberal democracies in its approach toward forces of intolerance. As 
this Article demonstrates, however, the reality is much murkier than 
this conventional wisdom. Although American extremists may enjoy 
great freedom in expressing their ideas, they face almost 
insurmountable barriers when they try to translate these ideas into 
political action through the electoral arena. Perhaps this is inevitable. 
Ultimately, the lesson may be that every democracy, whatever its free 
speech ethos, has to develop defense mechanisms that protect it from 
forces of anti-liberalism and intolerance. These mechanisms may be 
explicit and direct or implicit and unacknowledged. Whatever the 
case, the existence of these barriers should be recognized and their 
justifications and effects should be examined. Only when we are truly 
aware of the nature of these limitations can we avoid their misuse 
and over-reaching and ensure that we are drawing the restrictive line 
in the proper place. 
